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Abstract
Mean reversion in stock prices is a highly studied area in the financial literature with
controversial findings. While some economists have found evidence of mean reverting processes
in stock prices, many argue in favor of the Efficient Market Hypothesis which states stock prices
are random walk processes. This paper seeks to add to the literature on mean reversion but
testing for evidence in price-earnings ratios rather than stock prices. The study employs a robust
regression model controlling for company-specific and general market factors that influence
price-earnings ratio deviations. After correcting for heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and unit
root processes, the results indicate mean reverting behavior does exist in US equities from 20082017 and mean reversion in price-earnings ratios may occur more quickly than mean reversion of
stock prices. The outcome of this paper also implies some level of endogeneity in the ThreeFactor-Model proposed by Fama and French (1992).
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suggestions in my topic selection, data organization, empirical analysis and paper structure.
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I. Introduction
Whether stock prices and ratios can be described as random walk or mean reverting
processes is highly controversial within the financial literature. Mean reversion refers to a
tendency of asset prices or ratios to return to a trend path. This paper sets out to examine whether
the price-earnings (P/E) ratios of US companies have transitory components and thus exhibit
mean reverting behavior. Fama and French (1988) and Poterba and Summers (1987) are among
the first to provide direct empirical evidence that mean reversion occurs in US stock prices over
long horizons. At the same time, other economists are critical of their results. Richardson and
Stock (1989) and Richardson (1993) report that correcting for small sample bias may reverse the
results found by Fama and French and Poterba and Summers mentioned above. Moreover, Kim
et al. (1991) argue that mean reversion is a pre-World War II phenomenan and current stock
prices exhibit mean averting behavior.
The question of whether stock price-earnings contain transitory components poised in
this paper is important for financial practice and theory. For example, consider technical analysis
of stock price movements. If stock price-earnings ratios contain large transitory components,
then observing a stock with a P/E ratio statistically far from its mean may establish a trend that
could be traded technically. The notion of stock price trends is harshly rejected by many
economists who argue in favor of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which states that
share prices reflect all information about a security, including information derived from
fundamental and technical analysis. Therefore, it is theoretically impossible to consistently
produce risk-adjusted excess returns, or alpha, and only inside information can result in outsized
risk-adjusted returns.
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This paper can also be used to evaluate the claims made by Keynes in his book The
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) where he states, “all sorts of
considerations enter into market valuation which are in no way relevant to the prospective yield.”
Poterba and Summers (1987) state that “if divergences between the market and fundamental
value of a stock exist, but at beyond some limit are eliminated by speculative forces, then stock
prices exhibit mean reversion.” Thus, if Keynes’ claim is true and the psychology of speculators
can cause the market valuation of stocks to diverge from their fundamental values, evidence of
mean reversion in P/E ratios should exist.
Lastly, the results of this paper could have interesting implications on the Three-FactorModel proposed by Fama and French (1992). To expand on the traditional Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM), Fama and French suggest stock returns are explained by size and valuation
factors in addition to market risk. The valuation factor they employ is related to book-to-market
value of a stock, which is highly correlated to the price-earnings ratio. If P/E ratios are mean
reverting processes, there may be endogeneity in their valuation factor that is not properly
accounted for. A more in-depth discussion of these implications is located in the Theory and
Methodology section.
This study fits in an extensively researched section of the financial literature but seeks to
test for mean reverting behavior in stock price-earnings ratios rather than stock prices and
utilizes a slightly different methodology than those used by economists such as Fama and French
(1988). I utilize quarterly stock and sector data gathered from Bloomberg. The sample period
ranges from 2008 to 2017. The outcome variable of interest is the distance of the current P/E
ratio from its trailing five-year average and the explanatory variable of interest is its lagged
value. This is a similar model used to test for mean reversion in stock prices by Balvers et al
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(2000), but I introduce several more controls to achieve more accurate estimators. Moreover,
much of the previous literature employs variance ratio tests and standard unit root tests for mean
reversion. However, econometric studies by Campbell and Perron (1991), Cochran’s (1991) and
DeJong et al. (1992) indicate that standard unit roots tests have very low power against local
stationary alternatives in small samples. Further, Zhen (2010) argue that panel data can be used
to generate more accurate unit root estimation. In this paper, I employ a linear regression model
using panel data from S&P 500 companies to test for mean reverting processes in price-earnings
ratios.
While most of the previous literature examine stock price mean reversion, these results
can be misleading. Stock price movements occur for a wide variety of reasons, many of which
are either difficult or impossible to isolate. So, it will be difficult to isolate a reversion coefficient
due to potential endogeneity from many unobserved variables. The price-earnings ratio of a
company has well-grounded determinants, including expected growth, consistency of dividends,
company size, and extent of analyst converge, to name a few. Including these variables as
controls in a regression will allow me to get a more accurate and unbiased estimation of the
presence of mean reverting behavior.
The estimators of interest used in this paper are likely subject to several statistical biases
due to the nature of the data. Issues that I found to be present through the use of rigorous
econometric testing are heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and unit roots. The paper addresses
them by employing heteroskedastic-robust standard errors while differencing and detrending
each variable. There is also likely to be survivorship bias and small sample bias present in this
analysis. I address the former by using both time-series panels and pooled panels but fail to
address the latter due to limited time and resources. Regression results from both datasets
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support the mean reverting hypothesis, showing evidence of mean reverting processes in US
company price-earnings ratios from 2008-2017.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II will discuss the previous
literature on stock mean reversion and the relationship between price-earnings ratios and stock
returns. Section III will describe the theory behind my model and define the methodology used to
achieve unbiased estimators of my coefficients. Further, Section IV will review the data used to
address the research question. Finally, Section V will examine the results of the regression output
and will be followed by a comprehensive conclusion for this paper.

II. Literature Review
Most of the existing literature relating to this topic simply employs unit root and
stationarity tests to detect mean reversion in stock prices. There is also controversy over the
existence of mean reverting behavior in financial assets. Many economists argue in favor of the
EMH which, as mentioned in the introduction, asserts that all asset prices follow a random walk
and thus, do not exhibit mean reverting behavior. Some economists have found evidence of mean
reverting behavior through the use of variance ratio tests, but others believe correcting for biases
negates their findings.
This paper focuses on mean reverting behavior in price-earnings ratios, which has not
been widely studied in the financial literature. However, P/E ratios have been researched
extensively on their relation to excess returns in equity markets and as a determinant of equity
prices. Basu (1977) conducts an empirical study to test whether P/E ratios are related to
investment performance in common stocks. He does so by creating five diversified portfolios,
each with different portfolio P/E ratios. The results indicate lower P/E stocks are underpriced
relative to the market and tend to experience the highest unexplained excess returns. A study by
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Gill et al. (2012) finds that price-earnings ratios explain a significant portion of the variation in
equity share prices in the United States.
There have been ample studies into stock price mean reversion with conflicting results. A
study by Poterba and Summers (1987) aims to test whether transitory components account for a
large fraction of the variance in common stock returns using variance ratio tests. Using data on
firms form the United States and 17 other countries over the period 1926 – 1985, the authors find
positive autocorrelation in stock returns over short horizons and negative autocorrelation over
long horizons. They also report that transitory components in stock prices account for more than
half of the variance in monthly returns. They conclude mean reversion does occur in stock prices
and it is likely due to slowly-decaying "price fads" that cause stock prices to deviate from
fundamental value. Fama and French (1988) provide further evidence of transitory stock price
components in a study focusing on the relationship between dividend yield and stock returns.
They find that the power of dividend yields to forecast stock returns increases with the return
horizon and concluded this is likely due to time-varying expected returns generating temporary
components of prices. Another study by Fama and French (1988) investigates the permanent and
transitory components of stock prices during 1926 – 1985. They consider a time series dataset
and employ variance ratio tests similar to those used by Poterba and Summers (1987). Their
findings indicate a slowly mean-reverting component of stock prices tends to induce negative
autocorrelation in returns.
More recent studies also indicate mean reverting behavior in stock prices. Mukherji
(2011) uses a powerful nonparametric block bootstrap method and fresh data to examine the
unresolved issue of mean reversion in stock returns. The results show that both large and small
company stocks experienced significant mean reversion in returns for periods of 1 through 5
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years during 1926–1966. In 1967–2007, there was significant mean reversion in 5 year returns of
large company stocks, and 1, 4, and 5 year returns of small company stocks. The findings
indicate that, although mean reversion in stock returns has weakened in recent decades, it
persists, particularly for small company stocks. Another study uses panel data from national
stock market indices of 18 countries from 1969 to 1996 (Balvers et al. 2000). They find strong
evidence of mean reversion in relative stock index prices and a significantly positive speed of
mean reversion with a half-life of three to three and a half years. According to their findings,
investment strategies that fully exploit mean reversion across national indexes outperform buyand-hold strategies.
Other publications reject the possibility of mean reverting behavior and argue in favor of
the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Kim et al. (1991) compare stock return data before and after
World War II. Using randomization tests to calculate significance levels under the null
hypothesis that returns are distributed independently of their ordering in time, they find that
mean reverting behavior is an entirely pre-war phenomena and current stock prices exhibit mean
averting behavior. They interpret these results as evidence of a fundamental change in the stock
return process and conjecture that it may be due to the resolution of the uncertainties of the
1930s and 1940s. A paper by Zhu (2010) asserts that conventional unit-root tests have weak
power against stationary alternatives. His study uses unit-root tests in panel data to re-examine
the time-series properties of the stock prices as unit root tests on panel data appear to have
increased power of unit root tests. The results cannot reject the random-walk hypothesis for G-7
country stock-price indices. Richardson and Stock (1989) and Richardson (1993) develop an
asymptotic distribution theory for statistics involving multiyear returns and correct for the small
sample bias that they believe was present in previous mean reversion analyses. Their alternative
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theory provides substantially better approximations to the relevant finite-sample distributions
used in conventional financial theory. It also leads to empirical inferences much less at odds with
the hypothesis of no mean reversion and they claim their results may negate those found by
Poterba and Summers (1987) and Fama and French (1988).

III. Theory and Methodology
A typical formulation of a stochastic process for an asset displaying mean reversion to a
simple moving average, in this case in the asset’s P/E ratio, is as follows:
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �������𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �� = 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ��𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �������𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ��� + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ,
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1

(1)

where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the price-earnings ratio of company i at time t, �����
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the trend price-earnings

ratio of company i at time t, 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a constant, and 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a stationary shock term with an

unconditional mean of zero. The parameter 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 measures the impact of increasing the distance of

the previous P/E ratio from trend P/E ratio in the previous period on the distance of the current

P/E ratio from trend P/E ratio in the current period. To accept the alternative hypothesis that
mean reverting behavior exists in P/E ratios, 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 must be statistically significant and 0 < 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 < 1. If

0 < 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 < 1, deviations in P/E ratio from the trend are reversed as t increases which, by definition,

is mean reversion.

However, there is likely to be serial correlation as the model proposed is an
autoregressive process of order one. Therefore, first differencing will be applied to equation (1)
to yield the following:
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−2
�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
�� − �𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
�� = 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ��𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
�� − �𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
��� + ∆𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , (2)
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
�����𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
�����
�����𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
�����
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−2

which can be written more simply as:
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𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∆ �𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �������𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �� = 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �∆ �𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �������𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ��� + ∆𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 .
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1

(3)

The interpretation of 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is slightly different than in equation (1). In this case, the 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 measures the
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

speed of reversion between t – 1 and t. ∆ �𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �������𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �� represents the change in the distance of the
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1

observed P/E ratio for company i from the trend P/E ratio for company i from t – 2 to t – 1. If
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

∆ �𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �������𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �� has a positive value, that means the P/E ratio for company i diverged from the
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1

trend P/E ratio during the period between t – 2 to t – 1. Therefore, to accept the alternative

hypothesis that mean reverting behavior exists in P/E ratios, 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 must yield a statistically
significant and negative result. An intuitive interpretation of this model is given that the P/E ratio

of company i diverged from its trend value over the previous period, the P/E ratio should
converge towards its trend value over the current period if mean reverting behavior exists.
To estimate equations (1) and (3), I will employ the following econometric models:
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ,

∆𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃1 ∆𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∆𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + ∆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ,

(4)
(5)

where “𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ” is the distance of company i’s current P/E ratio in the current quarter from

its 20-period simple moving average as a percentage. In the context of this paper, the 20 period
simple moving average is equal to the trailing 5-year average P/E ratio for company i at time t.
“𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 ” is the one period lagged value of “𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ”. “𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ” is a vector representing the

set of control variables used, which includes pe_ratio, pe_ratio2, sector_delta, eps_growth,

lvolume, and lmarket_cap. Full descriptions of those variables can be found on Table A in the
Appendix and are discussed further in the Data Section. The variable pe_ratio is used to control
for companies that trade at unusually high P/E ratios; pe_ratio2 is the squared value of pe_ratio,
which is used to control for the decrease in marginal effect of increasing pe_ratio by one when
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the value of pe_ratio gets very large; sector_delta is used to control for business cycle changes
where certain sectors tend to trade at higher or lower P/E ratios; eps_growth is a key determinant
of P/E ratio as suggested by financial theory since companies that having accelerating earnings
growth can often sustain expanding P/E ratios for extended periods of time; lvolume is used as a
proxy for shock factors that may cause P/E ratios to deviate from their trend value since trading
volume tends to increase when investor sentiment is highly positive or highly negative;
lmarket_cap is used to control for the size of the company since larger companies tend to have
more analysts covering their stock, so there is more information available for investors to
consider when making an investment decision. Therefore, I would expect larger companies to
trade closer to their trend values. The coefficient of interest for equations (4) and (5) are 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 and

𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃1 , respectively, and the sign and significance of these coefficients will indicate whether mean
reverting behavior is exhibited.

Due to the nature of the data, there are several econometric issues that will need to be
addressed to get unbiased estimators. The four most important issues that this paper addresses
are heteroskedasticity, survivorship bias, serial correlation, and unit roots. Heteroskedasticity is
likely to exist in financial time series data, as indicated by the prior literature. Survivorship bias
is likely present in the time series panel data used in this paper and is discussed further in the
Data section of this paper.
Similar to many other financial time series datasets, the one used in this paper is likely to
be serial correlated. One of the most important predictors of company i’s P/E ratio this quarter is
the P/E ratio from the previous quarter. Specifically,
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝜉𝜉𝜉𝜉 + 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ,
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(6)
where 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙 is a statistically significant coefficient different from zero. This is likely an issue for
most of the variables employed in my study. In addition, the similar issue of unit roots is likely to

arise where 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙 = 1 or is close to 1. Unit root processes occur when the stochastic process that
determines the variable of interest is non-stationary and often appears in financial time series
datasets.
The presence of these econometric issues is tested for and discussed in further detail in
the Results section of this paper. The econometric technique that allows me to correct for
heteroskedasticity is using heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. Survivorship bias is minimized
through the use of a second pooled dataset but is not completely eliminated. To control for serial
correlation and unit roots, differencing and detrending are applied to the model.
While it was not the original intent of the present study, the results yielded could have
interesting implications for the three-factor model proposed by Fama and French (1992).
Consider the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) shown in equation (7), which is used to
determine a theoretically appropriate required rate of return of an asset to make decisions about
adding assets to a well-diversified portfolio:
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 �𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 � + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .

(7)

Fama and French expand on the CAPM by including two more factors believed to explain the
variation in required return of an asset. Market risk is still the primary determinant, but also
included is a company size factor (SMB) and a company value factor (HML):
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 �𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 � + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(8)

Their results indicate that small companies tend to outperform large companies, and companies
with high book-to-market ratios tend to outperform companies with low book-to-market ratios.
The book-to-market ratio of a company is defined as the inverse of the price-to-book ratio, so
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higher book-to-market ratios indicate higher values. They found similar results from other value
ratios; companies with lower price-earnings ratios tend to outperform companies with higher
price-earnings ratios. The value factor they propose is of interest since the mean-reverting
behavior of this factor is the focus of my study. If P/E ratios exhibit mean reverting behavior,
there may be a mean reverting function that goes unmodeled in their three-factor specification.
Thus, the value factor they propose may be endogenous, which would lead to bias in the
estimation of 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 in equation (8).

IV. Data

The datasets used in this paper were pulled from a Bloomberg Terminal and every
variable is measured quarterly from the first quarter of 2008 to the last quarter of 2017. One
dataset is organized in time-series panels where the same companies are followed from 2008Q1
to 2017Q4. The 50 companies used were randomly selected from the set of companies that have
remained in the S&P500 from 2008Q1 to 2017Q4. This is likely to cause survivorship bias
because companies that remain in the S&P500 for 10 years are likely high-quality companies. To
address this issue, I use a second dataset where 50 companies are randomly selected for every
observed year. The companies selected in the second dataset must have remained in the S&P500
for the entire year observed. This is meant to minimize survivorship bias and provide a
robustness check for the results yielded by the time series panels. While the time series dataset
only follows 50 companies, the pooled dataset follows 307 total companies and allows for the
companies observed to have released shares to the public after 2008. The same variables were
gathered from both datasets.
The outcome variable of interest is the absolute value of the percentage difference
between the current price-earnings ratio and the trend price-earnings ratio. The main explanatory
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variable is lagged value of the outcome variable. The variables for the value of the P/E ratio and
the P/E ratio squared as controls for companies that trade at unconventional P/E ratios. I include
the squared term since as a company’s P/E ratio gets very large, increasing the value by 1 will
not have as large an effect on the percentage difference from its trend. I use the trailing 20-period
simple moving average as a proxy for the trend value, which is used to calculate the outcome and
explanatory variables. I use the change in P/E ratio of each sector as for the business cycle, as
mentioned in the Theory and Methodology section. Finally, the earnings-per-share growth, log of
market cap and log of per-period volume act as controls for the determinants of a company’s P/E
ratio.

V. Results
The empirical results from the different models tested both indicate mean reverting
behavior in P/E ratios. However, as discussed in the Theory and Methodology section, the
interpretations are slightly different. The simple AR(1) OLS regression is displayed in Tables I.
The estimated coefficient on abs_diff_1 is positive, between 0 and 1, and statistically significant
at the 99% confidence level, which indicates mean reverting behavior is present in P/E ratios
between 2008 and 2017. Increasing the distance of a company’s current P/E from the company’s
historical P/E in the previous period by 1% is estimated to increase the difference in the current
period by 0.7381%. The estimated coefficients from the simple OLS regression on the remaining
variables are consistent with my expectations.
As mentioned earlier, to control for possible survivorship bias and as a robustness check,
I run the same regression using a pooled panel dataset. The results of the simple OLS model are
confirmed by the pooled regression, estimating very similar coefficients with the only one
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change in significance levels coming from sector_delta. The coefficient on sector_delta also
changed signs, but the pooled regression was inconclusive with a t-statistic of 1.25.
As with many financial datasets, the datasets I use likely suffer from heteroskedasticity in
the error terms. To test for the presence of heteroskedasticity, I run Breusch-Pagan’s test for
heteroskedasticity and the results for both datasets can be seen on Table E. As expected, both the
time series panels and pooled panels suffer from heteroskedasticity. Therefore, I will continue
my analysis using heteroskedastic-robust standard errors.
There is likely some time-constant, firm or sector specific unobserved factors lying in the
error term that may contribute to the distance of a firm’s P/E ratio from its historical average in
both the time series panel and pooled panel regressions. Specifically,
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ,

(9)

where 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the unobserved, time-constant factors and 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 . There are two

methods primarily used to address this issue, demeaning and first differencing. First differencing
can also be used to correct for serial correlation while demeaning cannot correct this issue by
itself. I discussed the theoretical possibility of serial correlation within the datasets used in the

Theory and Methodology section. After running the simple OLS, I find further evidence of serial
correlation since the R2 values from both time-series panels and pooled panels seems to be quite
high relative to the R2 values achieved by other papers in the financial literature. To confirm the
presence of serial correlation in my dataset, I estimate the impact of the lagged values of each
variable on the current period’s value along with the impact of the lagged residuals gathered
from a regression of each variable on the time trend. The results are displayed in Table F and
Table G, respectively, and indicate that every variable suffers from serial correlation. One
difference to note between the time-series and pooled datasets was the serial correlation was of
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significantly less magnitude in the pooled regression. This is likely because different companies
were used every year and I would not expect variable x of company i in year t to be serially
correlated to variable x of company j in year t+1. Nonetheless, there is evidence of serial
correlation in both datasets, so I opt to apply differencing to each variable rather than demeaning.
I also detrend each variable as detrending can also be used to address this type of bias.
To detrend, I regress each variable on the time trend t and gathered the residuals. More
specifically, to detrend variable xit, I estimate the model:
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼1 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ,

(10)

where 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥̈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 , which is the portion of the variation in xit not explained by the time trend. Every

variable is replaced with its detrended counterpart, so the model can now be written as:
̈ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
̈ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿̈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ,
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

(11)

where the accent over each variable indicates that is has been detrended. Next, I apply first
differencing to each variable for i firms and proceed to estimate the following regression:
̈ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 ∆𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
̈ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∆𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿̈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + ∆𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡.
∆𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

(12)

Notice that the time-constant unobserved factors 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 drops out, so I am left with serially
uncorrelated and exogenous variables.

Furthermore, an issue that often arises when dealing with financial time series data is
non-stationarity and random walks. These issues are known to be present if a variable follows a
unit root process. More specifically, variable xit follows a random walk with a drift, a special
type of unit root process, when
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇0 + 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ,

(13)

where 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is not statistically different from one. Moreover, since I am estimating an AR(1) model,

it is also important to see that the absolute value of 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for every 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 is less than one to ensure I
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have a weakly dependent, stable AR(1) process. To test for the presence of unit roots, I run a
modified form of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for panel data. I employ a Levin-Lin-Chu
unit test, which involved fitting an augmented Dickey-Fuller regression for each panel (Balvers
et al, 2000). One critical assumption that must hold for this test to yield accurate results is a
common autoregressive parameter for all panels. This means that the test does not allow for the
possibility that some panels contain unit roots while others do not. The results can be seen in
Table H and indicate that only two variables do not display unit root processes in the time-series
panels, and only one variable does not display a unit root process in the pooled. Conveniently, if
a variable has a unit root process, the first difference of the variable is stationary. Differencing
was already applied to correct for serial correlation, so I can continue my analysis using the
model specified in equation (12).
The results of the first differenced and detrended model confirm the findings of the
simple OLS model.
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Variable
First Lag of Absolute Difference
P/E Ratio
P/E Ratio2
Sector P/E Ratio Delta
EPS Growth Trailing 1 Year
Log of Volume
Log of Market Cap
Constant
R2
Observations

Simple OLS
Absolute Difference

Detrended and Differenced
(Robust SE)
Absolute Difference

0.7381***
(0.1333)
0.0037***
(0.0004)
-3.00e-06***
(4.87e-07)
0.0001**
(0.00005)
-9.99e-07
(6.63e-06)
0.0191***
(0.0050)
-0.0133***
(0.0050)
-0.2997
0.7206
2,000

-0.1270***
(0.0339)
0.0143***
(0.0014)
-0.00001***
(1.70e-06)
0.00005*
(0.00003)
2.54e-08
(1.67e-06)
0.0595***
(0.0195)
-0.3025***
(0.0511)
4.74e-06
0.4319
1,950

Note: (***) denotes statistical significance at the 99% confidence level, (**) denotes statistical significance at 95%
confidence level, (*) denotes statistical significance at 90% confidence level

As discussed in the Theory and Methodology section, the interpretation of this regression is
slightly different from the simple OLS model. The sign on the coefficient for abs_diff_1 flipped
from positive to negative while remaining statistically significant at the 99% confidence level, as
expected if mean reverting behavior exists. It is estimated that a 1% increase in the distance of a
company’s current P/E from the company’s historical P/E over the previous period is estimated
to decrease the difference over the current period by 0.1270%. Therefore, the difference between
the current P/E ratio and the trend will approach 0 over time, which is consistent with mean
reverting behavior. Again, this model estimates how a change in the distance of the current P/E
ratio from the trend over the period t – 2 through t – 1 affects the change in the distance over the
period t – 1 through t. It is not surprising to see that the level of R2 dropped rather significantly
between the simple and robust regressions from 0.7206 to 0.4319. This is likely due to
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detrending the second equation, since the time trend probably accounted for a large portion of the
R2 in the simple model.
Similar results were yielded from the pooled regression.
Simple OLS
abs_diff

Variable

Difference 0.7391***
(0.0157)
0.0015***
P/E Ratio (pe_ratio)
(0.0002)
-1.42e-06***
2
P/E Ratio (pe_ratio2)
(3.48e-07)
-0.0001
Sector P/E Ratio Delta (sector_delta)
(0.00008)
-3.38e-08
EPS Growth Trailing 1 Year (eps_growth)
(4.33e-06)
0.0271***
Log of Volume (lvolume)
(0.0043)
-0.0254***
Log of Market Cap (lmarket_cap)
(0.0044)
Constant
-0.4157
0.7206
R2
Observations
2,000
First Lag
(abs_diff_1)

of

Absolute

Detrended and Differenced
(Robust SE)
abs_diff
-0.2748***
(0.0644)
0.0092***
(0.0032)
-0.00002***
(7.18e-06)
-0.00005
(0.00008)
1.13e-06
(2.52e-06)
0.0346
(0.0223)
-0.3025***
(0.0739)
0.0006
0.4319
1,550

Note: (***) denotes statistical significance at the 99% confidence level, (**) denotes statistical significance at 95%
confidence level, (*) denotes statistical significance at 90% confidence level

As in the time series panel regression, the coefficient for abs_diff_1 is negative while remaining
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. The magnitude of the effect is actually larger
in the pooled regression, as a 1% increase in the distance of a company’s current P/E from the
company’s historical P/E in the previous period decreases the difference in the current period by
0.2748%, as opposed to 0.1270% in the time series. This may be the most interesting result
because I would have expected the effect to be lower in the pooled regression due to the lower
variance of the data. About 25% of the observations needed to be dropped in the first differenced
model since the companies observed changes every year and it would not make sense to
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difference the data from two different companies. Further, previous research suggests that mean
reversion takes several years (Balvers et al, 2000 and Poterba and Summers, 1987). If that is the
case, it would be unlikely to observe mean reversion within the year-long sample period
collected for each company. Thus, it is possible that the results yielded from this paper contradict
those of previous studies that support mean reversion. It may also be that P/E mean reversion
happens faster than price mean reversion, which was the primary topic of study in previous
works. Additionally, it may be that companies that released shares to the public after 2008
display more mean reverting tendencies. Only companies that were in the S&P500 from 2008 to
2017 were used in the first set of regressions, while new companies were selected every year for
the second.
Another difference between the simple and robust regressions to note is the increased
magnitude of the coefficient on lmarket_cap. After correcting for the biases mentioned above,
the magnitude coefficient increases 25 and 15-fold for the time series and pooled regressions,
respectively. A 1% increase in the market cap of a company is estimated to decrease the distance
of the company’s current P/E from the company’s historical P/E in the current period by
0.3025% in both the time series and pooled regressions. This result is consistent with financial
theory since larger companies are often highly covered by investment analysts, so there are
higher quantities of analysis on the company, so its price should act more efficiently and not
deviate as far from fundamental value.
A final detail to point out is the constant terms from both regressions. In the simple OLS
regression for both time series panels and pooled panels, the constant term was quite far from 0.
Holding all the employed variables constant, I would expect the difference between a company’s
current P/E and its historical P/E to be relatively close to 0, assuming markets are mostly
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efficient. The constant term yielded by the robust regression for both the time series panels and
pooled panels were consistent with this hypothesis, further indicating that the biases discussed
earlier were corrected for in the robust regression.
One issue that was not addressed but could be corrected for with further research is small
sample bias. While the results of the differenced and detrended model imply that P/E ratios
exhibit mean reverting behavior, small sample bias may be affecting the coefficients since only
10 years of data on 50 companies were collected. Richardson and Stock (1989) and Richardson
(1993) report that correcting for small-sample bias problems may reverse the Fama and French
(1988a) and Poterba and Summers (1988) results. Both Fama and French’s and Poterba and
Summers’ results provided the foundation for price mean-reversion investment strategies when
they were published. If correcting for small sample bias reverses their results, it is possible the
same can happen to my results. However, I will point out that both studies employed variance
ratio tests for mean reversion, which were not used in this paper.

VI. Conclusion
In this paper, an attempt was made to empirically determine whether price-earnings ratios
exhibit mean reverting behavior. The research conducted falls in the section of economic
literature on the Efficient Market Hypothesis; specifically, it aims to test the alternative
hypothesis of mean reverting processes in price-earnings ratios of a stock against that of a
random walk process. Previous literature on the topic rely on variance ratio tests and
conventional unit root tests using time series data to detect mean reversion. However, some
economists have found these tests to have little power against the stationary alternative and panel
data can be used to increase their power. This paper contributes a robust linear model using panel
data from US equites to achieve the a more accurate test for mean reversion. Further, the paper
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directly addresses and corrects for heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and unit roots which
attempting to minimize survivorship bias.
The results provide evidence of mean reverting processes in the price-earnings ratios of
US equities and appear to be robust to presence of survivorship bias. Previous works that found
evidence of stock price mean reversion state that mean reversion typically takes between three to
three and a half years to occur (Balvers et al, 2000). The output of this empirical study, however,
suggest price-earnings ratio mean reversion may occur much faster. Moreover, endogeneity in
the Fama and French Three-Factor-Model may be an important consequence of this paper, but
further research should aim to test this hypothesis directly. In addition, future studies should
attempt to correct for small-sample bias and increase the sample period to acquire more
consistent and unbiased estimators.

Appendix
Table A – Variable Descriptions
Variable Name Description
pe_ratio

Company’s P/E ratio in the current period

pe_ratio2

(pe_ratio)2

hist_pe

Company’s trailing 5 year average P/E ratio

ldiff_hist

ln(pe_ratio) – ln(hist_pe). Shows how far company’s current P/E ratio is
away from its 5 year average P/E ratio as a percentage.

abs_diff

Absolute value of ldiff_hist

abs_diff_1

1 period lag of abs_diff

sector_delta

Change in average sector PE ratio from the last period to the current period

eps_growth

Trailing 1 year earnings-per-share growth

lmarket_cap

Log of the company’s market capitalization in the current period

lvolume

Log of the number of company shares traded in the current period
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Table B – Summary Statistics from Time Series Panel Data
Variable
abs_diff
pe_ratio
pe_ratio2
hist_pe
sector_delta
eps_growth
volume
lvolume
market_cap
lmarket_cap

Observations
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000

Mean
0.385
22.996
3,350.62
19.748
.1922
9.686
4.19e+08
19.306
51.539
3.225451

Std. Dev.
0.443
53.134
38,984.87
17.431
115.01
805.19
5.78e+08
1.028
79.737
1.145

Table C – Summary Statistics from Pooled Panel Data
Variable
abs_diff
pe_ratio
pe_ratio2
hist_pe
sector_delta
eps_growth
volume
lvolume
market_cap
lmarket_cap

Observations
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000

Mean
0.2216
24.46
2,553.4
23.69
0.503
9.178
4.10e+08
19.086
34.575
2.837

Std. Dev.
0.3066
44.227
26,750.64
49.705
53.821
996.76
1.26e+09
1.116
59.858
1.141

Min.
0.00014
1.73
3.01
6.13
-1,526.18
-31,900
4,124,512
15.232
0.608
-0.498

Max.
3.540
781.60
610,904.8
172.07
1,524.38
5,100
6.40e+09
22.579
729.29
6.592

Min.
0.00018
0.942
0.888
2.983
-598.87
-39,770.69
20,260
9.916
0.028
-3.309

Max.
2.657
759.44
576,749.1
1016.435
815.71
9,300
2.99e+10
24.294
729.29
6.592

Table D – Ramsey RESET Test from Time Series Panels
Models
Without P/E Ratio2
With P/E Ratio2
R2

F-Statistic
114.13
2.08
0.7146

p-value
0.0000***
0.1028
0.7198

Note: (***) denotes statistical significance at the 99% confidence level

Table E – Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticity
Time Series Panel

Pooled Panel

chi2(1)

p-value

chi2(1)

p-value

1931.21

0.0000***

2413.97

0.0000***

Note: (***) denotes statistical significance at the 99% confidence level
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Table F – Serial Correlation (First Lag)
Pooled Panel

Time Series Panel
Variable

Coefficient on first lag

Adjusted
R2

abs_diff
pe_ratio
pe_ratio2
sector_delta
eps_growth
lvolume
lmarket_cap

0.8300***
0.8862***
0.8828***
-0.5221***
0.0964***
0.9739***
0.9918***

0.6864
0.7813
0.7791
0.2577
0.0088
0.9412
0.9812

Coefficient on first lag

Adjusted
R2

0.7952***
0.2885***
0.3403***
-0.0756***
0.1793***
0.0719***
0.1573***

0.5899
0.0791
0.1142
0.0044
0.0048
0.0044
0.0237

Note: (***) denotes statistical significance at the 99% confidence level

Table G – Serial Correlation (Lagged Residuals)
Time Series Panel
Coefficient
on
lagged residual from Adjusted R2
time trend regression

Pooled Panel
Coefficient
on
lagged residual from Adjusted R2
time trend regression

abs_diff
pe_ratio

0.8291***
0.8845***

0.6847
0.7778

0.1529***
0.2741***

0.0208
0.0710

pe_ratio2
sector_delta

0.8822***
-0.5225***

0.7774
0.2581

0.3355***
-0.0757***

0.1111
0.0044

eps_growth
lvolume
lmarket_cap

0.0940***
0.9703***
0.9881***

0.0083
0.9380
0.9801

0.1786***
0.0583**
0.0832***

0.0048
0.0026
0.0061

Variable

Note: (***) denotes statistical significance at the 99% confidence level, (**) denotes statistical significance at 95%
confidence level

Table H – Levin-Lin-Chu Test for Panel Unit Roots
Time Series Panel

Pooled Panel

Variable

p-value

abs_diff
pe_ratio

0.1769
0.5973

0.7422
0.9997

pe_ratio2
sector_delta

0.0009***
0.0001***

0.9353
0.0000***

eps_growth
lvolume
lmarket_cap

0.9984
0.9025
0.8749

0.9993
0.9932
0.9671

Note: (***) denotes statistical significance at the 99% confidence level
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Table I – Regression Output from Time Series Panels
Simple OLS
abs_diff

Variable
First Lag
(abs_diff_1)

of

Absolute

Difference 0.7381***
(0.1333)
0.0037***
P/E Ratio (pe_ratio)
(0.0004)
-3.00e-06***
2
P/E Ratio (pe_ratio2)
(4.87e-07)
0.0001**
Sector P/E Ratio Delta (sector_delta)
(0.00005)
-9.99e-07
EPS Growth Trailing 1 Year (eps_growth)
(6.63e-06)
0.0191***
Log of Volume (lvolume)
(0.0050)
-0.0133***
Log of Market Cap (lmarket_cap)
(0.0050)
-0.2997
Constant
0.7206
R2
Observations
2,000

Detrended and Differenced
(Robust SE)
abs_diff
-0.1270***
(0.0339)
0.0143***
(0.0014)
-0.00001***
(1.70e-06)
0.00005*
(0.00003)
2.54e-08
(1.67e-06)
0.0595***
(0.0195)
-0.3025***
(0.0511)
4.74e-06
0.4319
1,950

Note: (***) denotes statistical significance at the 99% confidence level, (**) denotes statistical significance at 95%
confidence level, (*) denotes statistical significance at 90% confidence level

Table J – Regression Output from Pooled Panels
Simple OLS
abs_diff

Variable

Difference 0.7391***
(0.0157)
0.0015***
P/E Ratio (pe_ratio)
(0.0002)
-1.42e-06***
2
P/E Ratio (pe_ratio2)
(3.48e-07)
-0.0001
Sector P/E Ratio Delta (sector_delta)
(0.00008)
-3.38e-08
EPS Growth Trailing 1 Year (eps_growth)
(4.33e-06)
0.0271***
Log of Volume (lvolume)
(0.0043)
-0.0254***
Log of Market Cap (lmarket_cap)
(0.0044)
Constant
-0.4157
First Lag
(abs_diff_1)

of

Absolute

Detrended and Differenced
(Robust SE)
abs_diff
-0.2748***
(0.0644)
0.0092***
(0.0032)
-0.00002***
(7.18e-06)
-0.00005
(0.00008)
1.13e-06
(2.52e-06)
0.0346
(0.0223)
-0.3025***
(0.0739)
0.0006
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R2
Observations

0.7206
2,000

0.4319
1,550

Note: (***) denotes statistical significance at the 99% confidence level, (**) denotes statistical significance at 95%
confidence level, (*) denotes statistical significance at 90% confidence level
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Abstract:
I conduct a mean-variance portfolio choice economic experiment to evaluate how individuals’ portfolio
choices deviate from what modern portfolio theory considers optimal. The experimental framework is
comprised of three treatments. In each treatment the portfolio selection task involves choosing between
two risky assets with zero correlation among their payoffs and one risk free asset. Participants are tasked
with completing thirty choice rounds in which they must allocate a constant experimental capital amount
to the available asset options after which they are shown period-by-period state-realizations. I utilize the
definition of dominance as described in Neugebauer (2004), and Baltussen and Post (2011), that states an
asset is dominant if it is attractive in isolation – the asset with the higher Sharpe-ratio. The risky asset, A
or B, that is dominant, and the return characteristics of the dominant asset vary over treatments 1, 2, and 3.
I find that, relative to theoretically optimal allocation, subjects disproportionately allocate their
experimental capital to asset A, the asset with higher expected return and variance, in all treatments, and
forgo the benefits to diversification that asset B provides. In order to analyze subjects’ allocation
decisions across treatments, I utilize Robust OLS and Fixed Effects regression frameworks.
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Introduction:
Standard theories of finance assume humans are computational, rationally minded actors.
Sharpe’s (1964) research on portfolio allocation, embodied in the CAPM, shows that rational investors
should choose a portfolio based on risk weighted return. Empirical evaluation of Sharpe’s model is
complicated by the uncertainty associated with the return and variance of real-world assets. The purpose
of this paper is to evaluate Sharpe’s model in an experimental setting where return characteristics can be
tightly controlled.
Specifically, I examine how human decision-making deviates from optimality in a portfolio
choice environment. Further, it is important to study the environment in which humans are prone to
making sub-optimal choices and to exploit the behavioral fallacies humans exhibit while making
investment choices. I add to the current body of literature by studying subjects’ ability to properly
diversify when a dominant asset is in their set of available asset options. Results from the three
treatments showcase how subjects’ allocation in relation to optimality is affected by changes in the
position 1 of a dominant asset. Moreover, this analysis provides further evidence alongside a growing body
of behavioral literature that showcases that humans are not the hyper rational actors that neoclassical
economic theory describes.
It is important to distinguish the laboratory environment from a naturally occurring environment.
In reality it is often impossible to observe data on a single subject over time, and it is often difficult to
observe the returns an investor received on an investment choice as well as how the investor reacts to that
return. Further, empirical studies of portfolio choice may analyze the decisions of investors at a firm or
corporation level and, as a result, fail to measure the preferences of any individual investor but rather
measure the choices that result from the action of many individuals with differing preferences (Kroll,
Levy, Rapoport. 1988). The experimental laboratory creates an environment where it is possible to
examine the behavioral biases humans exhibit while investing. Laboratory environments are described as
simplistic or unrealistic as they cannot account for the number of factors that affect individuals’
1

Position changes over the three portfolio choice treatments as the dominant asset changes from asset A to asset B.
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investment choices in a naturally occurring setting, but some important benefits of the laboratory setting
are described here: 1.) The ability to observe how an investor reacts to the return on an investment choice
creates the opportunity to observe whether subjects exhibit decision making biases in an investment
decision environment. 2.) Asset return distributions can be constructed to match the assumptions of
underlying portfolio models. 3.) The estimation of investor risk preferences is made possible by observing
a subject’s choices over time along with how their wealth changes over time. Further, estimating subjects’
degree of risk aversion is a necessary component in understanding their asset allocation choices.
The next section reviews previous authors’ study of portfolio choice and decision-making
behavior as well as differences in experimental framework across studies. Section III presents the meanvariance model, Section IV covers the experimental design and what the portfolio choice environment
allows me to analyze that is relevant to understanding human behavior. Data from the experimental
sessions are discussed in Section V. Section VI includes discussion on the econometric techniques
employed in order to analyze allocation choices across treatments, and Section VII concludes.
II
Literature Review:
Prior research relevant to this study has examined behavioral biases including overconfidence,
ambiguity aversion, and sequential dependencies (Kroll et al. 1988). The research I present compares
decisions against the normative theory of mean-variance analysis that describes the behavior an investor
should follow while allocating capital among asset options (Fabozzi, Markowitz, Kolm, and Gupta, 2013).
Portfolio theory provides a means to quantify the expected return and risk on a portfolio and introduces
the ability to combine assets with varying risk and return characteristics in order to create a portfolio with
a level of expected return corresponding to the individual assets within a portfolio but with a significantly
lower amount of risk (Fabozzi et al. 2013).
Decision making under risk and uncertainty has been studied by several authors. Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) criticize the ability of the Expected Utility Theory to describe decision making under risk
and present an alternative choice theory, called Prospect Theory. They analyze subjects’ responses to
choice-problems regarding risky outcomes defined by probability. Results support the following
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deviations from Expected Utility Theory: 1.) People overweight outcomes with certainty relative to
probable events (certainty effect). 2.) Subjects value changes in wealth rather the final outcome. 3.)
Marginal utility of loss is greater in magnitude than the marginal utility of an increase in wealth.
The experimental design I present benefits from the work of Kroll et al. (1988). They design a
portfolio selection task that involves subjects choosing between two risky assets with uncorrelated returns.
In their design, subjects also have the option to borrow and lend at a risk-free rate of 3%. Ackert et al.
(2015) analyze subject responses in a mean-variance context but differ from the experimental design of
Kroll et al. (1988) and the experiments I present as the two risky assets in their experiment have perfectly
negatively correlated payoffs. The mean-variance framework I implement differs from their 1988 study in
that subjects have the option to allocate their capital endowment between the two risky asset options and
the risk-free asset option whereas the framework of Kroll et al. (1988) requires that subjects allocate
capital between one of the two risky assets with the option to utilize the risk-free borrowing and lending.
Neugebauer (2004) and Baltussen and Post (2011) find that participants tend to disproportionally allocate
to risky assets that are attractive in isolation but ignore dominated assets that offer a lower expected return
but are attractive from a portfolio diversification perspective. The experimental design I implement
involves three treatments, and the position of the dominant asset in the experimental portfolio varies
across the three treatments. Further, the design I implement does not allow for borrowing or lending. The
specific design characteristics for each treatment are discussed in detail in Section IV.
The objective of Kroll et al. (1988) and Ackert et al. (2015) is similar to the research I present in
that these studies seek to identify the factors that compel individuals to hold inefficient portfolios and
how subjects allocate capital between risky and riskless assets. Kroll et al. (1988) specify their goal to
determine if the asset return distributions have the predicted effect on capital allocation. Further, they test
whether initial capital size affects portfolio selection by conducting different experimental sessions with
different initial amounts of wealth, and they analyze the effect of the ability to borrow and lend on
allocation to the risky asset. The experimental findings of Kroll et al., (1988) study show that about 26%
of all portfolios are mean-variance inefficient. Further, they observe a high number of switches in asset
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allocation choices between the two risky assets – a finding unsupportive of the mean-variance model.
Their results also indicate that subjects exhibit sequential dependencies and that subjects’ choices, with
regard to optimality, do not improve as they make more allocation decisions. Ackert et al. (2015) find
participants fail to properly balance risk and reward in their portfolios and that participants hold optimal
portfolios when their payout is contingent on a single period and knowledge of payouts is unavailable
until the end of the period. Additionally, they find the lack of feedback on allocation outcomes eliminates
the behavioral bias resulting from misunderstanding of randomness.
Overestimating how closely one’s decisions resemble the optimal choice is a violation of standard
finance theory documented in experimental literature known as overconfidence. Dittrich et al. (2001) take
an experimental approach to test overconfidence in investment decisions by allowing participants the
ability to choose an alternative investment choice in place of their own. Their findings provide evidence
to support the fact that overconfidence increases with deviation from optimal choices as well as task
complexity and decreases with uncertainty. In a six-year study on the diversification choices of 60,000
individual investors at a large U.S. brokerage firm, Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) find that underdiversification among individual investors is related to investment choices characterized by trendfollowing behavior and over-confidence. In order to accurately draw these conclusions, they measure the
covariance structure of investors’ portfolios and analyze diversification in terms of holding more than one
security as well as the presence of imperfectly correlated stocks in investors’ portfolios. Empirical studies
of individual portfolio choices in naturally occurring environments support results in the experimental
setting in that investors fail to properly diversify (Ackert et al. 2015).
The experimental environment provides an opportunity to observe ambiguity aversion as the
probability of an event occurring in a natural environment is rarely known. Charness and Gneezy (2010)
analyze how portfolio choice depends on three behavioral phenomena: ambiguity aversion, the illusion of
control, and myopic loss aversion. They find that when experiment participants are asked to pay to
decrease ambiguity, increase control, or obtain more frequent feedback on investment choices,
participants’ investment choices do not change as a result of the level of ambiguity, preference for control
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is nonexistent, and that participants were willing to pay to have more frequent opportunities to change
their investment choices. Ahn et al. (2007) analyze ambiguity aversion using data from a portfolio choice
experiment. In their experimental design, subjects allocate their endowment between three assets and each
asset produces an equal payout in one of three possible states. One asset payout occurs with a known
probability, the other two occur with unknown probability. Their findings show that subjects exhibit
considerable heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion. Ahn et al. (2007) fail to reject the null hypothesis of the
Subjective Expected Utility theory for the majority of their experiment participants. Now, it is relevant to
discuss the framework of the mean-variance model and outline its assumptions.
III
Mean Variance Model: 2

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = ∑𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(1)

The mean-variance framework assumes that investors are risk averse and desire to maximize
the expected utility of wealth. Equation (1) describes the total return, R, over a time period, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡, from

individual assets, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, with individual returns, 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, and weights, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤. The mean-variance portfolio choice model
provides a solution to the investor’s problem. The model is constructed to create the optimal balance of
risk and reward, measured by expected return and variance (or standard deviation) associated to the
random normal distribution specific to each asset option. Further, the MV model assumes that one capital
allocation choice is preferable over another if the expected return of the allocation is greater and its
variance lower.
(2)

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 ≥ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤

𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤) ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 (𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤)

(3)

Equations (2) and (3) describes these preferences where 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 are the expected excess returns on

the allocations A and B, respectively, and 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 and 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 are the variances corresponding to each

allocation.

2

Discussion of the mean variance model in this section follows that of Kroll, Levy, Rapoport. (1988)
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Portfolio theory underlying the mean-variance portfolio choice experiment involves the study of
the capital allocation line and the opportunity set of risky assets. The opportunity set of risky assets shows
all combinations of portfolio expected return and standard deviation constructed from available assets. In
the case of Figure I, the opportunity sets of risky assets A and B for treatments 1, 2, and 3 are shown.
Portfolio theory suggests the optimal portfolio choice is the point along the opportunity set of risky assets
where risk adjusted return is maximized. The tangency point that produces the highest slope on each of
these opportunity sets denotes the optimal portfolio and is the point at which the Sharpe ratio of the twoasset portfolio is maximized.
Figure I: The Opportunity Set of Risky Assets

3

In order to solve the investor’s problem of maximizing expected utility from wealth, portfolio
theory provides a solution for the weights of the two risky assets in the optimal risky portfolio. The
weights4 of the risky assets are calculated in equation (4).
3

Zimmermann, David. "A Gentle Introduction to Finance Using R: Efficient Frontier and CAPM – Part 1." Data
Shenanigans. October 13, 2016. Accessed April 5, 2019. https://datashenanigan.wordpress.com/2016/05/24/agentle-introduction-to-finance-using-r-efficient-frontier-and-capm-part-1/.
4
Bodie, Zvi, Alex Kane, and Alan J. Marcus. Investments. McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2014. Pp 217. Equation (7.13)
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𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 =

IV
Experimental Design:

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 )𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎 2 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 −𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 )𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ,𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 )
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 )𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎 2 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 +𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 )𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎 2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 −[𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 )+𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 )]𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ,𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 )

(4)

𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 1 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

Participants receive a set of instructions (see Appendix) describing the nature of the capital
allocation problem and are made aware of the risk and reward characteristics of the asset options and
experiment payoff structure. In treatments one, two, and three, subjects are tasked with completing a
series of 30 choice rounds during which they allocate their working-capital among two risky assets,
option A and option B, as well as the risk-free asset, option C, which carries a fixed return value of 1%. In
treatment 1, option A has an expected gross return value of 11% and a standard deviation of 10%, option
B has an expected gross return of 3.5% and a standard deviation of 5%. In treatment 2, the risk-reward
characteristics of options A and C remain unchanged, but option B now carries an expected gross return
of 8.5% and a standard deviation of 5%. In treatment 3, the return characteristics for options A and C
again remain unchanged, but option B carries an expected gross return of 2% and a standard deviation of
5%. As mentioned earlier, the payoffs of the two risky asset options are uncorrelated in all three
treatments. Inputting these asset return characteristics into equation (4) allows me to see the optimal
allocation weights for option A and B across the three treatments. In treatment 1, options A and B are
equally attractive from a portfolio diversification perspective and portfolio theory suggests participants
should allocate their capital to these risky assets in equal proportion. In treatment 2, asset B is dominant,
and portfolio theory suggests participants should allocate 25% of the capital they will invest in risky
assets to option A and 75% to option B. In treatment 3, the dominant asset is option A. Portfolio theory
suggests participants should allocate 71.4% of the capital to be allocated to risky assets to option A and
28.6% to option B. These optimal allocation proportions are reiterated in Section VI.
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This portfolio choice experiment is administered through Z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for Readymade
Economic Experiments) software 5. After reviewing instructions and payoff structure, subjects click
through a series of screens that display random-normal computer-generated draws specific to the riskreward characteristics of asset options A and B in each treatment. I do this in order to provide subjects
with a baseline understanding of random-normal draws and to enforce the fact that with higher expected
return comes higher risk. Upon completion of these ‘draw’ screens, subjects continue to the capital
allocation choice problem. Participants have access to 50 experimental dollars (ED) in working capital at
the beginning of every choice round over all three treatments. Participants then enter the amount of
experimental capital they choose to allocate to each asset, knowing the total allocation amount between
the asset options must be equal to the available working capital of 50 ED. After option allocation amounts
are specified, the computer-generated draw specific to the random normal distribution of each asset
option is applied to each asset allocation. Any returns, positive or negative, are applied to the subjects
total ED account. At the end of each choice round, subjects have the opportunity to observe their updated
account, the draw (percent return) they received on option A and option B, as well as the return on their
allocation to each asset option.
Upon completion of the 30 choice rounds, subjects are then instructed to complete the Holt-Laury
(2002) questionnaire that tasks participants with choosing a series of paired lottery choices. In this
questionnaire, subjects choose between options A and B (different than risky assets A and B) ten times.
Each option carries with it the probability for low payout as well as the probability for high payout. As
subjects make their decisions, they are aware that only one of their choices will be selected at random to
determine their earnings from the questionnaire. The expected payouts on options A and B change over
the ten paired decisions. As a result, measuring the point at which subjects switch from choosing option A
to option B provides a measure of subject risk preference. Upon completion of the treatment, subjects’

5

Fischbacher, Urs. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments." Experimental economics 10, no.
2 (2007): 171-178.
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total experimental dollar account, the returns they receive from their working capital allocation, is
converted to U.S.D. at a rate of 4ED:1U.S.D.
V
Data:

The data set generated from 48 subjects over all treatments produces 1,440 observations over the

course of thirty choice rounds. Data is recorded in the Z-Tree experimental toolbox (Fischbacher, 2007)
on each subject over the course of their thirty decision rounds and the Holt-Laury (2002) questionnaire. I
seek to observe how subjects’ capital allocations deviates from optimal allocation proportions according
to the mean-variance portfolio framework. I measure the amount subjects allocate to the two risky assets,
option A and option B, as well as subjects’ allocations to the risk-free asset, option C. The computergenerated draws corresponding to the random-normal distribution specific to each asset option are also
recorded.
Although a subject is not required to allocate experimental capital to each risky asset during a
decision round, the return received on each asset option is presented to subjects. The return on the
allocation to an asset provides subjects with a means to easily understand how their allocation choice
affect their total ED account. It is important for participants to see how their working capital changes
across periods due to the fact that participants may have some expectation with regard to the return they
believe they should receive over the course of thirty choice rounds. The presence of this expectation may
cause participants to alter their allocation among the two risky assets and risk-free asset such that their
portfolio in a given round takes on more or less risk in order to achieve a desired benchmark return.
Measuring these variables and providing subjects the opportunity to observe the outcomes of their
decision upon completion of a choice round increases subjects understanding of the risk reward
characteristics specific to each asset option and how volatility in asset returns impacts working capital.
The number of times a subject chose option B, the risky choice of the two options, in the HoltLaury (2002) questionnaire is recorded as a measure of risk preference. However, some experiment
subjects exhibit behavior that implies misunderstanding of paired choice problem in that they choose
option A some number of times, choose option B, and then switch back choice A. I measure the number
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of times a participant chose A as their last selection of this option, and subtract this amount from ten, the
total number of choices, to calculate the number of times they chose risky option B.
VI
Results:
This section provides analysis on subjects’ asset allocation choice over the three treatments in this
framework. Table I shows optimal allocation amounts by treatment. Figure II displays the average
proportion of risky asset capital that subjects allocated to asset A. Table II provides Z-scores on the
average proportion of ED that subjects allocated to asset A by treatment, and Table III provides Z-scores
over specific periods in order to investigate learning and end-game effects.
Table I: Optimal portfolio weights by treatment:
Treatment
Weight A*
Weight B*

1(%)
0.5
0.5

2(%)
25
75

3(%)
71.4
28.6

Figure II Average Proportion Allocated to Asset A in Relation to Optimality Over Choice Rounds
in Treatments 1-3:

The proportion of capital allocated to asset A is computed as:
(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)
.
(𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)
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Table II: Proportion of risky asset capital allocated to option A in all choice rounds.
Treatment
1
2
3

Periods 1-30: Average
Proportion Allocated to
Option A.
0.7185
0.4662
0.7189

Z-Score (Optimal
Hypothesis)
19.14838
25.26242
-0.5591691

In order to investigate the effects of learning as well as the effects of nearing the end of the 30
choice-rounds, I compute the proportion of risky asset capital participants allocated to option A in periods
1-10, and periods 11-20 to investigate the effects of learning, and then compute the proportion allocated
to option A in periods 1-25, and periods 26-30 to investigate end-game effects. I do this under the
hypothesis that the proportion allocated to option A is equal to the mean-variance optimal solution as well
as the hypothesis that the proportion is equal to the average proportion allocated to option A across the
three treatments.
Table III: Investigating Learning and End-Game Effects Across Treatments.

In treatment 1, where optimal allocation is defined as placing an equal proportion of ED in option
A and B, I see that subjects allocated a higher proportion of their experimental capital to option A in
rounds 11-20 than they did in rounds 1-10. To calculate the Z-statistics in Table III, under the optimal
hypothesis, I conduct a proportional Z-test on the average proportion of capital subjects allocate to option
A out of the total capital they allocate to risky assets against the mean-variance optimal solution. Further,
I conduct a Z-test on the average proportion of capital that subjects allocated to option A in the specific
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rounds noted above against the average proportion that subjects allocated to option A over all choice
rounds. As these allocation proportions are significantly different, according to the Z-statistics above,
from the optimal allocation hypothesis as well as the treatment average allocation hypothesis, this
provides evidence that subjects allocation choices take on more risk as the treatment progresses. With
regard to end-game effects, a similar relationship holds. Participants allocate a significantly higher
proportion of their capital to asset A in periods 26-30 than in periods 1-25. This shows that participants
take on significantly more risk in their allocation decisions towards the end of treatment 1.
In treatment 2, where option B is the dominant asset in the portfolio, I observe that participants
allocate a lesser proportion of their risky asset capital to asset A in periods 11-20 than in periods 1-10;
however, these allocation proportions are significantly higher than the optimal proportion of 25% of risky
asset capital in option A. For end-game effects, similar to treatment 1, subjects allocate a higher
proportion of their risky asset capital to option A in rounds 26-30 than in rounds 1-25. Again, these
allocation proportions are significantly higher than the optimal allocation proportion to option A and
suggest that participants make take on disproportionate amounts of risk in their final allocation decisions.
In treatment 2, observing Z-scores under the treatment average hypothesis, I see that in rounds 1-10 and
rounds 1-25, participants average proportion allocated to option A is not statistically different, but in the
final choice rounds of 26-30, participants do allocate a significantly higher proportion of their
experimental capital to option A.
In treatment 3, asset A is dominant, and I observe that participants allocate significantly less than
the optimal proportion of 71.4% of their risky asset capital to asset A in periods 1-10 and 11-20. In
periods 11-20, subjects showcase greater deviation from optimality as they allocate a lower proportion to
option A than they do in periods 1-10. In periods 1-25, subjects’ allocation decisions are not significantly
different from the optimal as well as the treatment hypothesis, and in periods 26-30, unlike treatments 2
and 3, subjects do not take on higher risk and allocate significantly more risky-asset capital to asset A.
I observe the average allocation proportions in treatments 1 and 3 are similar across choice
rounds. A possible explanation behind this result is that participants observe the simple fact that option A

13

42

carries a higher marginal return characteristic than asset B. While option A still carries a higher marginal
return than option B in treatment 2, the difference is not as large. Such similar proportional allocations
support the fact that participants allocation choices do not resemble the mean-variance solution but may
provide evidence that a driving factor in how subjects weight their portfolios is the marginal return
characteristics of their available asset options.
Econometric Results:
To further analyze subject decision making, I implement robust OLS and Fixed Effects by subject
and period model specifications. The dependent variable in each model is the amount allocated to option
A in the current period. In both model specifications, I include as controls the total experimental dollar
account, the return received on the allocation to option A in the last period, a binary variable equal to one
if the return on the allocation to option A was negative in the last period, the return received on the
allocation to option B in the last period, a binary variable equal to one if the return on the allocation to
option B was negative in the last period, a binary variable equal to one if the subject allocated to option A
in the last period, a binary variable equal to one if the subject lost money in the last period, and include
period and interactions of period with treatment as additional controls. In the robust OLS model
specification, I also control for the number of times a subject chose option B in the Holt-Laury (2002)
questionnaire as a measure of risk preference.
Robust OLS:
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶3 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 B𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶5 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶6 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽7 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶8 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽9 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶10 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡

Fixed Effects:
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶3 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 B𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶5 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶6 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶7 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽8 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
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Table IV: Summary Statistics:

Table V: Coefficient estimates and their significance for each model specification:
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Discussion of Regression Results (all treatments):
The coefficient estimate on subjects total ED account is positive and statistically significant at the 95%
level in both model specifications and suggests that as participants progress through choice rounds and
derive positive returns from their capital allocation, they allocate a significantly higher amount of their
working capital to option A. The coefficient estimate on the return the subject received on their allocation
to option A in the last period is positive and highly statistically significant in the robust OLS model, but is
positive and statistically insignificant in the Fixed Effects model specification. The positive sign on this
coefficient estimate suggests presence of sequential dependency. The coefficient estimate on the binary
variable, equal to one if the subject received a negative return on their allocation to option A in the last
period, is positive and highly statistically significant under the robust OLS model and positive and
insignificant under the Fixed Effects model specification. The positive sign on this coefficient estimate
suggests that subjects increase their allocation to option A after receiving a negative return on the prior
period. This result suggests subjects may desire an asset with a higher return characteristic in order to
counteract their loss. The coefficient estimate on the return on option B in the last period is negative and
statistically significant under the robust OLS model and is negative and insignificant under the Fixed
Effects specification. The sign of this estimate is in line with expectations as it is reasonable to assume
that subjects would allocate less of their working capital to option A, and more to asset B, if B received a
higher return in the last period. The coefficient estimate on the binary variable, equal to one if the subject
received a negative return on their allocation to option B in the last period, is negative and statistically
significant under the robust OLS model and negative and insignificant under the fixed effects model. I
observe that the magnitude of this coefficient estimate is practically high, but is not in line with our
hypothesis as I expect a negative return on option B in the last period would cause subjects to increase
their allocation to option A in the current period. The coefficient estimate on the binary variable, equal to
one if the subject allocated to option A last period, is positive and statistically significant in the robust
OLS model and positive and insignificant under the Fixed Effects model. This aligns with our hypothesis
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as I expect this variable captures a subjects propensity to allocate working capital to option A. The
coefficient estimate on the number of risky choices a subject made in the Holt-Laury (2002) questionnaire
is positive and statistically significant in the robust OLS model. This is in line with expectations as I
expect that subject who chose the riskier choice more often are more likely to allocate a greater
proportion of their working capital to the more volatile asset option with prospect for higher return.
Period controls in the robust OLS model specification are negative and statistically significant and are
negative and statistically insignificant under the Fixed Effects specification. This showcases participants
decrease the amount of working capital they allocate to option A as the treatment progresses. This result
is out of line with our expectations as I observe, for treatment specific results, that participants increase
the proportion of risky asset capital allocated to option A as they move on in choice rounds.
VII
Discussion of Results and Conclusion:
In the three treatments I implement in this experimental framework, the risk-reward
characteristics of the asset options that I choose create clear differences in the optimal allocation
proportions across treatments. In treatments 1 and 3, it is important to note that asset A has a higher
expected return (11%) than its standard deviation (10%) whereas asset B has an expected return of (3.5%,
2%) and standard deviation (5%, 5%) in treatments 1 and 3, respectively. The simple fact that asset A has
higher a higher expected return than standard deviation, while asset B does not, likely contributes to this
disproportionate allocation.
In treatment 2 asset B now has a higher expected return than standard deviation. Asset A carries
the same risk-reward characteristics, but asset B now has an expected return value of (8.5%) and standard
deviation of (5%). In treatment two I see subjects allocate a nearly equal proportion of their experimental
capital to each asset option; however, their choices are significantly different from the optimal allocation
proportions according to the mean-variance solution. This raises the question, in the experimental
environment, do subjects benefit from taking on a high amount of risk in their capital allocation? No
participants experience bankruptcy in this experimental framework due to the fact that subjects have 50
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ED to allocate every period and only hold the returns from their allocation. The risk reward characteristics
of the risky assets are such that it is extremely unlikely that a subject would experience continual negative
draws on an allocation. As a result, this may push subjects to take on risk in the experimental
environment.
Limitations to the study I present include the small number of subjects that participated in this
series of portfolio choice treatments. Of 48 total subjects, 16 subjects participated in one of the three
experimental treatments. Certainly, increasing the number of participants would improve the robustness
of the results I present. Further, it is important to note that the 48 participants are 18-22-year-old
Gettysburg College students. While I control for the risk preferences of subjects through the Holt-Laury
(2002) questionnaire, it is likely the risk preferences of 18-22-year-old college students do not resemble
that of, for instance, those who are closer to retirement age, which may decrease the external validity of
the results I present. Finally, in the future it would be beneficial to test for the presence of an ‘A-effect’ in
the treatment I present. It is plausible that as subject observe the risky assets in the treatments are named
assets A and B, they may believe asset A is inherently better. This could easily be examined by switching
the asset return characteristics of the two risky assets over the three treatments and observing whether
subjects exhibit similar behavior in each case.
I emphasize the benefit of the laboratory environment in that it provides a controlled setting to
observe choice behavior. Further study of human decision-making behavior is crucial in order to
understand the factors which cause humans to exhibit behavioral biases. Better understanding of where
humans are prone to behavioral bias is relevant when considering the actions of investors in capital
markets as well as individuals’ ability to properly structure their assets to achieve greater financial
stability. Moreover, the breadth of evidence that suggests humans do not allocate their asset optimally
advocates for better solutions to diversification, or, better access to diversification in order to solve the
investors problem. The dominant asset framework in this study provides additional insight as to why there
is higher volatility at the aggregate market level that results from the disproportionate amount of risk
investors take on in their investment decisions.
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Appendix
Experiment On-Screen Instructions:
Outline of Experimental Framework: “This is an experiment in decision making. Your payoff will
depend partly on your choices and partly on chance. Please pay careful attention to these instructions. The
experiment should be completed in approximately an hour and a half. During the decision-making portion
of the experiment, you will be working with 'experimental dollars' (ED) that will be converted to U.S.
dollars upon completion of the experiment at a ratio of 4ED = 1$ US. At the end of the experiment, you
will be paid privately and in cash your earnings plus a $7-dollar participation fee.”
Payoff Instructions:
“The experiment will consist of thirty decision making rounds. In each round you will choose
how to allocate 50ED between three asset options. Two of the asset options will have different risk
reward characteristics. The other risk-free asset option will allow you to gain a 1% return on the capital
allocated to this asset and exposes you to no risk of losing experimental dollars. In each choice period,
you will see three boxes labeled A, B, and C. In each choice round, you must allocate all of your 50ED
among these asset options.”
Choice Round Instructions:
“To choose an option, use the mouse to click on the box corresponding to each portfolio or cash
option. Then, type in the experimental dollar amount you would like to allocate to each option. You must
allocate all of your 50 ED in each period. In other words, the sum of the amount you place in each option
must be equal to 50ED. An onscreen message will appear if your allocation amounts do not sum to 50 ED.
Your payoff in each round is determined by your allocation of experimental dollars to each option.
The three options have the following risk reward characteristics:
Option
A
B
C

Average Return

Standard Deviation of Return

11%
8.5%
1%

10%
5%
0%
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At the end of the choice round, the computer will draw, from the random-normal distribution
specific to each option, a return value for your allocation. Any returns, positive or negative, will be added
to your total experimental dollars, and then you will move on to the next decision round. In the next
decision round, you will have access to the same 50 experimental dollars that you had at the start of the
treatment, and the resulting gain or loss from your allocation decision will be added to your total
experimental dollars. This process will be repeated for a total of thirty decision rounds. At the end of the
thirty rounds, you are asked to complete a brief questionnaire, and then you will be called out individually
and paid in private. Your payment will be the $7 participation fee plus your total experimental dollars
converted into real dollars at a rate of: 4ED = 1USD.”
Example Decision Round:
“Here is an example of a decision round: 'You begin the experiment with 3$ in experimental
dollars and allocate one experimental dollar to each option. For option A, the computer would draw a
return from a distribution with an expected return value of eleven percent and standard deviation of ten
percent. This return would be applied to the 1$, and the return amount would be allocated to your total
experimental dollar account. For option B, the computer would draw a return from a distribution with an
expected return value of eight and a half percent and standard deviation of five percent. This return value
would again be applied to the $1, and the return amount would be allocated to your total experimental
dollar account. The dollar allocated to option C would receive the guaranteed return of one percent and
this capital would be allocated to your total experimental dollar account. In the next choice round, you
would have access to the same $3 in experimental dollars to allocate among the available asset options. '
You will notice that the asset options have different expected returns. Note also that the asset
options with higher expected returns have higher standard deviations-this means they also have an
increased chance of negative returns or outsized positive returns.
In the following screens, you will observe a series of 'draws' that display the return on a $1ED allocation
to each asset option, as in the above example.”
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Abstract
Despite having the second largest economy at $13 trillion, China has only recently
surpassed the World Bank’s definition of the ‘middle-income range’ which is a gross national
income per capita between $1,000 to $12,000 (constant 2011 international $). This is a
noteworthy accomplishment since many other developing nations have fallen victim to economic
stagnation within this range leading to the term “middle-income trap”. This paper will argue that
one of the ways in which China escaped the middle-income trap and will continue to grow its
economic influence is through the support of blockchain technology. Research and development,
early technological adoption and business climate all play a role in explaining how the Chinese
public and private sector have used blockchain technology to encourage economic growth. While
there are many questions and misconceptions about blockchain technology and its place in
China, this paper seeks only to answer a select few.
1. – Introduction
“The first generation of the digital revolution brought us the Internet of information. The
second generation — powered by blockchain technology — is bringing us the Internet of value:
a new platform to reshape the world of business and transform the old order of human affairs for
the better” said influential author Don Tapscott (Guarda 2016). As outlandish as that claim may
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sound, with a total cryptocurrency market capitalization of $270,638,328,602 as of August 2018
and a 24hr trade volume of $14,378,130,110, Mr. Tapscott might be right (Cryptocurrency
2018). There are already over 1700 cryptocurrencies and 12372 digital markets and these
statistics don’t even fully capture the extent to which blockchain technology has and will
continue to change the world. This paper seeks to shed light on the development of blockchain
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technology in China and its long run economic impact on the nation but first, a brief overview of
the technology itself.
Blockchain technology is a digital database structure with the potential to revolutionize
the processes and capabilities of countless industries. This innovative technology has immense
value for a wide array of applications because it can increase speed, transparency, and
immutability of transactions while minimizing costs. Blockchain technology is most famous for
being the underpinning of decentralized cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum which
have become an increasingly hot topic for their ability to operate outside of the oversight of
third-party entities, increasing individual sovereignty and network trust. However, this type of
digital database has also shown promise in a myriad of other industries, including traditional
financial activities, supply chain management, energy efficiency, social impact initiatives and
digital identities. For any industry or activity that could be improved by having an immutable
record of transactions with the potential for a high level of transparency, blockchain technology
is a powerful mechanism for future growth and development.
1.1 – Nodes, Ledgers and Consensus
While blockchains differ greatly depending on their purpose, there are some
commonalities that give them their unifying backbone. A mastery of its mechanisms is not
necessary to enjoy the benefits (just as with driving a car or using the internet) but having a basic
understanding of blockchain will be useful in recognizing promising investment opportunities,
corporate implementation strategies, and furthering the global adoption of this technology. At its
most fundamental level, there are three crucial components of any blockchain: nodes, ledgers
and consensus.

3

52

Nodes are the individual network users who communicate with others to maintain an
agreed upon chain of data. In the popular context of cryptocurrencies, nodes are the users that
buy, sell, trade, and sometimes mine the digital assets “constructed to function as a medium of
exchange, premised on the technology of cryptography” (Chohan 2017).
Ledgers are the fluid copies of the network transactional history that nodes possess, and
the ledgers are kept in the form of distributed chained blocks. Blocks are simply data structures
that utilize cryptography to minimize digital size while increasing trustworthiness and
transparency. Block structure varies but most blocks contain metadata, a pointer to the last
chained block as well as a summary of the stored transactional history.
Consensus is an agreed upon processing system that allows nodes to assess and agree
upon which newly created blocks are valid and worthy of being chained to personal ledgers.
When all nodes agree, they are in a state of consensus and all records are final. As with block
structure, the way in which networks achieve consensus varies but dividing blockchains into the
subcategories of public chain, private chain, or a hybrid of the two does help to shed light on the
topic.
1.2 – Public, Private and Consortium Blockchains
Public blockchains are the branch of blockchains that most people have heard about since
this type includes the electronic cash system Bitcoin as well as the open-source operating system
Ethereum. These networks have open membership, the potential for anonymity, no central
authority and a consensus mechanism that all nodes can partake in. The two most popular
consensus mechanisms for this branch of blockchain networks are Proof-of-Work (PoW) and
Proof-of-Stake (PoS), a proposed alternative to PoW and its real-world shortcomings.
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Private blockchains are another type of blockchain that have been gaining exposure as
more firms and institutions speak of their potential. This centralized style has selective
membership, known network users, a central block-creating process, and the ability to
manipulate outsider visibility. This concept is in direct contrast with those who have turned to
blockchain technology as way to avoid third party oversight but does still retain the
cryptographic auditability function (Buterin 2015).
Consortium chains are a hybrid of the two previously mentioned blockchain styles, and
this type brings together selective membership, visibility restriction capabilities, and node-driven
consensus mechanisms. All three types of blockchains have their specific advantages and a mix
of all three should be expected to be seen in the future as wider array of blockchain applications
come into fruition.
1.3 – Blockchain and China
Blockchain technology has revealed itself to be highly disruptive digital database
structure with the potential to redefine how information is stored, shared and protected in a
plethora of applications. Through a combination of research and development, early
technological adoption and business climate, China has positioned itself at the forefront of global
blockchain application and innovation. Further supportive policy decisions will aid China in
transitioning towards being a technological innovator which should help maintain strong
economic growth (Zilibotti 2017). Using both neoclassical macroeconomic theory regarding long
run growth and a modern macroeconomic theory relating a nation’s growth rate to its proximity
to the technological frontier, I will explain why policy decisions related to blockchain technology
will help the nation maintain economic growth.
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2. – Literature Review
After China’s economic opening under Deng Xiaoping in 1978, the world’s most
populous nation has experienced unprecedented economic growth skyrocketing it to being the
second largest economy in the world. Despite annual GDP per capita growth over 8% during the
past few decades and 660 million people being lifted out poverty, Chinese income inequality has
grown at an alarming rate, peaking with a Gini coefficient of 0.491 in 2008 (UNDP China 2016).
Increased FDI inflow, selective privatization, and the development of globally
competitive production facilities for industrial inputs have been effective policy choices for
China’s historically impressive growth but this model has started to reveal its shortcomings.
Using international evidence, three statistics related to China’s economic status are red flags for
the nation’s future growth. As explained in Eichengreen, Barry, and others’ 2012 paper “When
Fast-Growing Economies Slow Down: International Evidence and Implications for China”, a
rapid-growing catch-up economy is likely to slow down if its “per capita incomes reach around
US$ 17,000 in year-2005 constant international prices, … [or] the share of employment in
manufacturing is 23 percent… [or] when income per capita in the late-developing country
reaches 57 percent of that in the country that defines the technological frontier”. All three of
these indicators are true for China so for it to continue its strong economic growth despite these
foreboding characteristics the government will have to change its approach towards economic
growth. The high rate of growth generated from massive capital stock investments in the
previous decades is no longer translating into the same increases in national output. This is a
critical juncture for the Chinese economy with the choice of either transitioning towards more
productive industries and becoming a technological innovator or following suit with many other
emerging economies and fall victim to the middle-income trap.
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There have been many studies that have investigated China’s long-run economic growth
trajectory and most agree on the necessity for China to turn to technology creation over adoption
for strong continued growth. In his 2017 paper “Growing and Slowing Down like China”,
Fabrizio Zilibotti concluded that China’s “high-growth trajectory then hinges on the transition
from investment-driven to innovation-driven growth” as it approaches economic convergence
with “developed” nations. Ha and others reached a similar conclusion in their 2009 paper
“Optimal Structure of Technology Adoption and Creation: Basic versus Development Research
in Relation to the Distance from the Technological Frontier” that as a nation’s “distance to the
technological frontier narrows, the growth effect of basic R&D increases [and] that the quality of
tertiary education has a signiﬁcant positive effect on the productivity of R&D”.
This concept brought to light the positive relationship between innovation-driven growth
and improvements to human capital stock. Luckstead and others explored this topic and
concluded in their 2014 paper “China’s catch-up to the US economy: decomposing TFP through
investment-specific technology and human capital” that human capital “plays a central role in the
decomposition of [Chinese] TFP” which goes hand in hand with Hongbin Li and other’s
conclusion in their 2017 paper “Human Capital and China’s Future Growth” that there is “a clear
positive correlation between income and education level of the sample countries for all five years
of data”. Shujie Yao and others empirically explored the results of Chinese policy on
technological progress and human capital accumulation. One of the conclusions in their 2006
paper “Building a strong nation, how does China perform in science and technology” is that
despite China’s split approach of promoting domestic technology and attracting FDI and outside
technology, “there is lack of evidence to prove that China has become one of the world’s front
runners in knowledge creation and innovations”.
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With all this in mind, if China aims to make blockchain technology the future of domestic
technological innovation, policies to encourage research and innovation are critical. “As a late
comer of industrialization, China is not able to create all the new technologies that are required
to modernize its economy” (Yao 2006) which has explained its propensity for technological
imitation. However, the literature agrees that this approach will not suffice for the sort of high
level of economic growth that China aims to maintain. To continue to elude the infamous
middle-income trap and achieve ‘developed’ nation status, China will need to lead the way on
some technological fronts.
3. – Theory
3.1 – Total Factor Productivity
While there are many ways to interpret Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) policies on
blockchain technology. This paper will use the neoclassical Cobb-Douglas production function
to consider China’s long-run economic growth by assessing the recent policy developments as
changes to total factor productivity. Specifically, how supportive Chinese policies on blockchain
technology have positioned China to continue to enjoy its trend of strong economic growth into
the 21st century. It will be argued that recent Chinese policies related to blockchain technology
have created great business and research conditions for innovation, increasing the technological
growth rate which would put the Chinese economy on a more explosive economic trajectory.
The Cobb-Douglas production function defines an economy’s economic output (Y) as a
function of labor (N), capital (K) and total factor productivity (A) as seen below:
Y = f(A,N,K)
(1)
1

Yt = At∙Nt𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 ∙Kt1 − �1

|�| < 1 & � and 1-𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 are output elasticities dependent on the economy’s state of technology
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Manipulating this equation, two conclusions can be drawn. The first is that the balanced
growth rate of output is proportional to the sum of the growth rate of labor and the growth rate of
technology [gY ∼ gA + gN]. The second conclusion is that balanced growth path for output per
worker is proportional to the growth rate of technology [gy ∼ gA] (see Technical Appendix).
The undeniable role that the growth rate of technology plays in both total output and output per
capita growth is critical to this paper’s claim that recent Chinese policies supporting blockchain
technology growth will be major factors in China’s high growth in the future.
Total factor productivity (TFP) is commonly defined as the contributions to output that
are outside of labor and capital inputs (Comin 2006). Considering the relatively expansive and
open-ended nature of TFP, it is often considered the greatest contributor to economic growth.
Three of the most academically discussed components of TFP are human capital, technology,
and institutions which includes government policies.
3.2 – Innovation-led Growth vs. Investment-led Growth
In line with the theory developed in Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006) (AAZ), this
paper will cite policies and developments where China has opted for innovation-led growth over
investment-led growth. Considering China’s relative proximity to the technological frontier,
aiming for this form of growth should lead to even greater long-run economic growth rates.
Zilibotti et al. said, “when the economy is far from the technology frontier, the main growth
engines are physical capital investments, the imitation of more productive foreign technologies,
and the reallocation of resources from less to more productive activities” (Zilibotti 2017).
However, once this economy has nearly capitalized on all the benefits capital accumulation, a
new approach is necessary for continued growth. When “the economy has come closer to the
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technology frontier, it must switch on a new engine: innovation” (Zilibotti 2017). Failing to
make progress towards innovation-led growth might explain why “many developing economies
get thrown off their high-growth trajectories as they approach 25%–30% of the world technology
frontier” (Zilibotti 2017). Providing the environment for innovative firms and ideas to flourish
has the capability of sustaining a nation’s growth to a degree that capital accumulation alone
cannot.
4. – Policy Timeline 2
10/31/2008

Bitcoin’s white paper is published
China takes open stance on Bitcoin
Financial institutions banned
from crypto usage
Digital exchanges forced into
offshore banking
PBoC’s Digital fiat currency
project made public
PBoC opens Digital Currency
Research Institute
China bans ICOs

11/20/2013
12/05/2013
04/10/2014
02/01/2017
06/30/2017
09/04/2017
09/15/2017

Fiat-to-crypto trading prohibited in
China, driving out exchanges

MIIT establishes Trusted
Blockchain Open Lab in Beijing

09/20/2017
01/03/2018
03/27/2018
04/09/2018
05/30/2018
06/28/2018

PBoC launches its first blockchain
platform (BROP) for IPR
Xi Jinping calls blockchain an
“economic breakthrough”

China releases plan to minimize
Bitcoin mining
1.6bln CNY to be spent on
Blockchain Industrial Park
Court rules blockchains could
authenticate evidence

(See Timeline Works Cited)

4.1 –Anti-Crypto Legislation

2

PBoC: People’s Bank of China

| ICO: Initial coin offering
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Despite China’s support and adoption of blockchain technology, the CCP has not been as
supportive of decentralized cryptocurrencies. China was one of the first nations to develop an
affinity for Bitcoin and much of this was not with CCP’s best interests in mind. As both a tool
for speculation and circumventing strict capital controls, many Chinese citizens found Bitcoin as
an appealing investment. After taking a relatively benign stance on Bitcoin a month prior, the
Chinese Communist Party’s first major restriction on the cryptocurrency came in December of
2013 and forbid financial institutions from trading the currency on the premise of its overly
speculative nature. In April of 2014, the Party’s next restrictive policy was driving crypto-tocrypto digital exchanges out of China by not allowing such companies to operate through the
central banks.
After this price and trade-volume deflating legislation was enacted, China entered a
period of minimal government intervention regarding blockchain technology and high digital
asset demand despite the uncertain business climate. The business geography of the blockchain
industry in China was primarily fintech companies in Beijing and Shanghai, mining operations in
western provinces such as Xinjiang and Sichuan, and high-tech manufacturing occurring in
Shenzhen.
2017 was an explosive year for the blockchain ecosystem. Not only were governments
starting to give greater recognition to the technology’s potential, but funding, adoption, and
interest were reaching new peaks thanks to the popularization of initial coin offerings (ICOs).
Initial coin offerings are much like initial public offerings of companies in the traditional finance
space but specific to cryptocurrencies. To combat incidences of fraud, nefarious fundraising and
financial manipulation, China banned initial coin offerings on September 4th, 2017. This decision
was quickly followed up with a ban on fiat-to-crypto trading in China which further drove out
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domestic digital exchanges. These two policies are the most famous Chinese policies about
blockchain technology but as the Timeline and Argument of this paper will explain, that does not
tell the full story.
5. – Argument
5.1 – Research and Development
One approach the CCP has taken towards advancing the development of blockchain
technology in China is through investing in specialized research in higher education institutions.
In 1998, Project 985 was put into action. This government-funded project set out to establish
“world-class universities” that would help push China into becoming a nation capable of
producing new talent with the human capital to rival any other nation (China Education 2018).
Of the 39 higher education institutions that received government funding under Project 985, 28
have newly established academic features associated with blockchain technology (Table 1).
Three nonacademic examples of China taking a more aggressive approach towards R&D
include the People’s Bank of China opening the Digital Currency Research Institute in June of
2017, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) establishing the Trusted
Blockchain Open Lab in September of 2017, and the announcement of the Blockchain Industrial
Park in Hangzhou and its 1.6 billion yuan in funding from both the private and public sector
(Timeline). Yao Qian, director-general of the PBoC’s Digital Currency Research Institute said,
“Conducting deep research on blockchain is the right thing for China to do to develop financial
technology” (Xueqing 2018) a high value service industry that both the private and public sector
seek to strengthen. Funding of this magnitude is a clear example of China making strides toward
innovation-led growth.
5.2 – Early Technological Adoption
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Despite the CCP’s distaste for decentralized cryptocurrencies, China has been on the
cutting edge of blockchain adoption for all variations of blockchains. A notable Chinese public
blockchain is NEO, a community-driven blockchain project that “utilizes blockchain technology
and digital identity to digitize assets and automate the management of digital assets using smart
contracts” (NEO 2014). The NEO community’s goal is to combine digital assets, digital
identities, and smart contracts to create a smart economy. By not attempting to be a competitive
currency in the Chinese economy, NEO has been able to live relatively harmoniously within
China in ways that most other public blockchains have not.
The public sector’s approach to blockchain technology has been through the
implementation of private chains. The “Big Four State-owned banks – Bank of China, China
Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and Agricultural Bank of Chinaalso use the technology on their projects, including poverty relief, international trade, home
renting platform, e-commerce chain” (Zhang 2018). For example, the Bank of China is
implementing a blockchain-based system to better manage the local poverty reduction fund in
Tibet since the province has an unemployment rate four times greater than the national average
(Wu 2018). This would not be achievable without the transparency and distributed nature of
blockchain technology.
The People’s Bank of China has made it clear that private chains are not the only form of
blockchains that they see value in going forward. One of the most interesting announcements
made by the PboC was in February 2017 when they announced their project to create a digital
fiat currency utilizing “the core features of cryptocurrency and the existing monetary system”
(Zhao PBoC 2018). Another example of the PBoC displaying its commitment to blockchain
adoption was when the Hangzhou Blockchain Research Institute presented its Blockchain
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Registry Open Platform (BROP) at the Global Financial Science and Technology Summit on
March 2018. “The BROP is an open platform for developing independent intellectual property
rights based on blockchain, according to its white paper (in Chinese). The platform will work
with partners to make credible records of user identity, certificate data, and digital credentials for
enterprise users. It plans to provide verifiable and supervised ownership registries and
information on public services” (Borak 2018).
An interesting example of a consortium chain in China is MATRIX, the sole blockchain
and AI solutions provider for the Party’s One Belt One Road Initiative. MATRIX offers all types
of blockchain solutions, not just consortium chains, and has a promising future since “The
national government [has] put aside trillions to pour into belt and road projects and [has] recently
invested $2.1 billion in an AI research park in Beijing”(cryptweeter 2018).
Perhaps the most progressive decision regarding blockchain adoption in China was a
judicial decision made in June 2018. A court in China’s Hangzhou city ruled that evidence
authenticated with blockchain technology can be presented in legal disputes. This court set both
a national and global precedent by stating that, “the usage of a third-party blockchain platform
that is reliable without conflict of interests provides the legal ground for proving the intellectual
infringement” (Blockchain 2018). The acceptance, acknowledgement and usage of blockchain
technology by the China’s government are promising signs of China aiming to position itself at
the technological frontier.
5.3 – Business Climate
Another component of total factor productivity that China has been manipulating for its
economic benefit are its institutions. Institutions include government policies, rules, and
regulations. While there have been many disheartening institutional decisions made by the
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Chinese government regarding blockchain applications including the ICO and fiat-to-crypto bans
in September of 2017, the technology itself has seen tremendous government support.
In a more general sense, business conditions for blockchain startups were improved when
after an inspection by the State Council, “25 provincial regions, 82 cities and 116 counties will
be entitled to 24 incentive measures for their achievements in major policies in 2017, including
supply-side reform and optimization of business environment” (China 2018). The official also
noted that the 2018 innovation-led growth plans were mainly focused on “Beijing, Tianjin and
Hebei province… advancing the incubation of cutting-edge technologies” (FTZs 2018).
After President Xi Jinping gave a rousing speech saying both that “a new generation of
industrial revolution is substantially reshaping the global economic structure” and that “artificial
intelligence, internet of things and blockchain [are] constantly making application
breakthroughs” (Zhao Xi 2018) it was clear that the CCP wanted the world to know about its
attitudes towards the next generation of technology. This powerful statement also was
accompanied by the State Council’s ordering of the “Guangdong Free-trade Zone to accelerate
blockchain development and application” (Zhao Xi 2018) which further clarified the CCP’s
intentions for the technology.
Chinese blockchain industry growth has been astounding with the number of new
blockchain companies in 2016 tripling those from 2015, “40% of all Chinese Blockchain startups
[beginning] in 2017” and “68 equity financing initiatives for blockchain startups in the first
quarter of 2018” alone (Zhao IT 2018). Policies of this nature have clearly done a tremendous
job at providing funding, talent, and viable business opportunities for those seeking to expand the
understanding and application of blockchain technology.
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Patents are another tangible measure of human capital growth and innovation-friendly
institutions. “More than half the world’s 406 blockchain-related patents in 2017 came from
China” (Patent 2018) and this trend of dominance is growing. “China filed 225 and 59 patents in
2017 and 2016 respectively, while the US filed 91 and 21 in 2017 and 2016 and Australia took
third place with 13 and 19 blockchain-related patents applications” (Patent 2018). In 2017, four
of the ten global leaders in blockchain patent filings: Alibaba, Bubi Technologies, Hangzhou
Fuzamei Technologies and Hangzhou Yunphant Network are Chinese firms (Table 2). Despite
all that has occurred regarding cryptocurrency regulation, the policies surround research,
adoption, and innovation have transformed China into the leading pioneer.
6. – Conclusion
The Chinese Communist Party’s approach towards blockchain technology has been
confused thanks to a few restrictive regulations in past decade. The reality of the matter is that
the Party is carrying a variety of plans to augment the implementation and development of
blockchain technology within China.
Educational policies like Project 985 transformed Chinese higher education institutions
into academic juggernauts, many of which have blockchain affiliated academic resources in the
form of research institutes and key laboratories. Roughly half the world’s blockchain patents in
2017 came from China, demonstrating the nation’s edge in blockchain innovation. The
establishment of the Digital Currency Research Institute in Beijing and the Blockchain Industrial
Park in Hangzhou are two more examples of how the public and private sector are also
contributing towards improving human capital related to blockchain technology.
The rate of technological progress is also increasing thanks to the government’s early
adoption of the technology. All the major state-owned banks have implemented blockchain
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technology to some degree. Additionally, the acknowledgement of blockchain-based data being
viable evidence in court means that the theoretical benefits of blockchain adoption are being
realized in a tangible manner.
China’s attempt to transition away from secondary industries like textiles and electronics
manufacturing is directly in line with the AAZ theory that long run economic growth is best
sustained by innovation-led growth over basic investment-led growth as a nation approaches the
technological frontier. Blockchain technology has already shown its tremendous potential in the
world of financial technologies, a high-value service-based industry that also assist in China’s
transition towards tertiary service industries. Beyond that, blockchain technology will elevate the
economy because of its ability to improve efficiency levels for a plethora of other industries from
supply chain to healthcare.
The significance of China’s push towards blockchain adoption and innovation also
connects to underlying economic challenges that China is facing today. In the financial realm,
blockchain technology will improve transparency, efficiency and accessibility so the many
millions of people in western China who are unbanked are likely to be given a whole new range
of financial opportunities. State-owned banks are already working on poverty-relief efforts that
incorporate the technology. With the capability to economically empower individuals who have
been left behind by the traditional financial systems, this technology could not only strengthen
China’s economy in the major cities along the east coast but also be a tool to lift people out of
poverty in the interior of China.
Research and development, early technological adoption and business climate relating to
blockchain technology are all critical ways in which China is encouraging economic growth
through blockchain technology.
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9. – Technical Appendix
The Cobb-Douglas production function Y = F(A, N, K) or Yt = At∙Nt𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 ∙Kt1 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼

decomposes an economy’s production (Y) as a function of labor (N), capital (K) and total factor
productivity (A). 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 and 1-𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 are output elasticities. A critical assumption of this equation is that
labor and capital display constant returns to scale together but diminishing returns to scale

individually. With the assumptions in place, factors are in perfect competition and therefore
receive only their marginal products:
Marginal product of capital: dY/dK = MPK | Marginal product of labor: dY/dN = MPN
A complete differentiation of the production function: dY = FAdA + FNdN + FKdK
Fi is the partial derivative of factor i or the marginal product of that factor. This means it can also
be written as dY = FAdA + MPNdN + MPKdK
By dividing through by Y and converting factor changes into rates of growth the same
equation can be expressed as: dY/Y = (FAA/Y)(dA/A)+(MPN*N/Y)(dN/N)+(MPK*K/Y)(dK/K)
To simplify notation, growth rates can be denoted as gi = di/i representing percentage change of a
given factor. gY = (FAA/Y)gA + (MPN*N/Y)gN + (MPK*K/Y)gK
(MPN*N/Y) and (MPK*K/Y) represent the share of income that goes to capital and labor
respectively since factors receive their share based on their marginal product due to constant
returns to scale and therefore perfect competition. This equation can further be simplified by
replacing these two terms with 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 and 1- 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼. These terms can also be referred to output elasticities.

(FAA/Y), the share of income dedicated to total factor productivity, is not as concrete of an
output elasticity since total factor productivity is a multi-faceted variable. In this paper the

growth rate of total factor productivity and the share of income given to total factor productivity
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are analogous enough to represent with the singular term gA. The now simplified equation can be
expressed as: gY = gA + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼gN + (1- 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)gK

The two conclusions made in the theory section of this paper refer to the composition of

variables on a balanced growth path, a macroeconomic condition that the Chinese economy has
been trending towards. On a balanced growth path an economy’s output and capital level grow in
unison. With this in mind, gY and gK can represented by the same term.
gY = gA + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼gN + (1- 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)gK
[Substitute gY in for gK]
gY = gA + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼gN + (1- 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)gY
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼gY = gA + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼gN
gY = (1/𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)gA + gN
gY - gN = (1/𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)gA
[Use division property of logarithms to combine gy and gN]
g(Y/N) = (1/𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)gA
gy = (1/𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)gA
The growth rates of output, capital, and labor can follow the properties of logarithms
since the diminishing returns to either input individually creates an output growth path that
would be comparable in shape that of that logarithmic function. Based on this model, total
output’s balanced growth path would also grow at a faster rate now that China has implemented
policies that will increase the growth rate of technology. Output per capita, a popular proxy for
standard of living, is an economic variable that’s long run trajectory is often discussed. If the
employment to population ratio is constant over time then output per capita would have a
balanced growth path that mirrors output per worker. The employment to population ratio has
been consistent over the last decade with a range of 0.88 of a percentage point. So as with the
balanced growth path of output per worker, output per capita would grow at a faster rate now that
China has implemented policies to accelerate the growth rate of technology.
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10. – Appendix A
Table 1 – Blockchain-related Assets at Higher Education Institutions
Institution

Key Feature

Beijing Institute of Technology

Beijing Laboratory of Intelligent Information Technology

Beijing Normal University

Zhongguancun International Incubator

Beihang University

Key Laboratory of National Defense Science and Technology
for Trusted Network Computing Technology

Central South University

Information Security and Big Data Research Institute

Chongqing University

Institute of Intelligent Computation and Information Security

Dalian University of Technology

Provincial Research Center for Internet of Things

Fudan University

National Demonstrative Experimental Computer Science
Center

Harbin Institute of Technology

Research Center of Computer Network and Information
Security Technology

Jilin University

Institute of Computer Science and Technology

Lanzhou University

MOE Engineering Research Center of Open Source Software
and Real Time System

Nanjing University

Internet of Things Engineering (IOFTE) Center

Nankai University

Institute of Big Data Technology Research

Northeastern University

Key Laboratory of Big Data Management and Analytics

Peking University

Member university for affordable education DAO

Renmin University of China

Research Center of Data Warehouse and Business
Intelligence

Shandong University

Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information

Shanghai Jiaotong University

MOE Engineering Research Center of Network and
Information Security

South China University of Technology

Guangdong Province Information Security Technology
Engineering Research Center
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Southeast University

Research Center of Future Network

Sun Yat-sen University

Information and Communication Technology Research
Center

Tianjin University

Key Laboratory of Advanced Network Technology and
Application

Tongji University

X Lab

Tsinghua University

Financial Technologies Lab

University of Electronic Science and
Technology of China

IBM Mainframe Laboratory

University of Science and Technology
of China

National High Performance Computing Center

Xiamen University

IoT and IT R&D Center

Zhejiang University

Zhejiang University Blockchain Research Center

East China Normal University

Shanghai Key Laboratory for Trustworthy Computing

Table 2 - 2017 Leaders in Blockchain Patent Filings
Rank

Name

Filings

1

Bank of America

45

2

EITC Holdings

42

3

CoinPlug

39

4

Alibaba

36

5

IBM

34

6

NChain Holdings

33

7

Bubi Technologies

30

8

Mastercard International

21

9

Hangzhou Fuzamei Technologies

19

10

Hangzhou Yunphant Network

18
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Abstract
This theoretical paper studies the issue of fiscal transparency, which we define as asymmetry
of information between the households’ perception of fiscal policy and the actual government
balance sheet, in the context of a 24-hour news cycle. We model the economy using the New
Keynesian three-equation model to study the effect of fiscal transparency on output, inflation,
and especially government debt in order to draw conclusions that are relevant in the realm
of policy-making in a sovereign debt crisis scenario. We find that a higher degree of fiscal
transparency leads to greater levels of output and inflation as well as higher government
debt.
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1. Introduction
This paper theoretically analyzes how the government’s transparency with regards to
its fiscal position affects output, inflation, and especially public debt. We choose these
three variables because they are mostly representative of the economy and they allow us to
capture most of the effects of fiscal transparency on economic outcomes. Moreover, these
three economic outcomes are the most present in the existing literature. This has to do with
the notion that the effects of fiscal transparency on the real economy are mostly indirect,
which means that choosing other outcomes, such as employment or the capital stock, may
lead to far-fetched conclusions about their relationships.
Transparency in regard to all government activities is a cornerstone of a democratic
society, as the people elected to public office have an obligation to keep their constituents
informed to ensure that they are acting in their best interest. It is in fact not a coincidence
that authoritarian regimes are known to give a distorted version of the truth, or even to
outright lie, to their own citizens to make sure that they do not question the government’s
behavior. In the last two to three decades households have been able to retrieve important
fiscal policy information from the media, thanks to the existence of a 24-hour news cycle,
as the activities of governments in developed countries have been under a great degree of
scrutiny. In particular, one of the topics which most news outlets spend a lot of time covering
is government debt and fiscal policy. However, given the relatively infinite amount of channels
through which individuals can obtain this information, they sometimes end up forming fiscal
policy opinions that deviate from the government’s actual fiscal position (Bernoth and Wolff,
2008). One of the greatest issues that arise with the existence of such a large number of
news outlets has to do with how they each interpret an official government announcement,
especially when it is not a transparent one. This issue has had the attention of global
financial markets especially since the 2016 Presidential Election and the rise of the fake news
phenomenon across most developed countries.
The principal issue that we investigate is how fiscal transparency (or lack thereof, referred

76

3
to as fiscal opacy) affects market expectations of future fiscal policy. In particualr, we
assume that both the government itself and media outlets make an announcement on the
current status of fiscal policy which allows markets to form beliefs on future fiscal policy
outcomes. Intuitively, if the media’s announcement is close enough to the government’s,
then the government is being relatively transparent with regard to its fiscal position, and
vice-versa otherwise, and is thus able to conduct expansionary fiscal policy and efficiently
allocate money to meaningful projects. We hypothesize that fiscal opacy generates nontrivial uncertainties in the economy that cause households to act sub-optimally and expect a
smaller fiscal stimulus then they otherwise would, therefore leading to lower income, inflation,
and government revenue.
In this paper we model the economy using the New Keynesian 3-equation model to
study the impact of this specific issue on output, inflation, and government debt. The vast
majority of the papers that have been written are empirical ones, so this paper’s contribution
is to study a heavily-researched topic using a new theoretical approach. Our results from
comparative statics analysis are consistent with our hypothesis and provide a theoretical
backing for the existing quantitative findings. Specifically, they agree with the works of
Galois and Wei (2002) and Teig (2006), Sargent and Wallace (1989), and Bastida et al.
(2015) in that a lower degree of uncertainty on fiscal policy, generated by a relatively more
transparent government, has beneficial effects across the economy: total output and inflation
increase, thus suggesting positive economic outcomes, and government debt also increases,
caused by the government’s higher revenue and a greater degree of freedom to implement
the fiscal stimuli that it intends to.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we place the topic of fiscal transparency in the existing economic literature; in section 3 we set up the theoretical model; in
section 4 we solve the model and analyze the results by conducting comparative statistics;
section 5 is the conclusion.
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2. Literature Review
As we mentioned above, the existing literature abounds of studies on the effect of government transparency on economic outcomes. It is further divided into two separate categories,
fiscal transparency and interest rate transparency. This theoretical paper fits inside the first.
The literature, most of which is empirical, shows evidence that fiscal transparency is generally associated with a better economic outcomes, good governance, and more democratic
(Fukda-Parr et al., 2011; Kopits and Craig, 1998). Furthermore, countries with low levels of
fiscal transparency tend to be low-income, authoritarian regimes, and located in parts of the
world with ongoing internal and international wars (Guillamon et al., 2011). The asymmetry
of information generated by a non-transparent government causes a suboptimal outcomes
because of wasteful and inefficient government spending (Persson et al., 1997). Heald (2003)
is one of the few papers that claim that fiscal transparency is not always beneficial, arguing
that an “overexposure” to government budgetary information may lead to some inefficiencies,
political polarization, and high maintenance costs.
Since a lot of papers study the effect of fiscal transparency on output and inflation at
the same time, we cover them simultaneously. Wehner and Renzio (2010) and Baldrich
(2005) both find non-trivial positive relationships between fiscal transparency and GDP per
capita. Similar works study the same relationship through a third outcome. Gelois and
Wei (2002) find that lower fiscal opacity increases confidence in international investors, and
therefore foreign direct investment, which leads to higher levels of GDP and inflation rates.
Sargent and Wallace (1989) claim that fiscal transparency is closely tied to a well-functioning
monetary authority. Especially in countries that adopt inflation targeting or that operate
under high government debt, fiscal transparency is of fundamental importance: it puts
pressure on interest rates and the money supply, and thus inflation levels. Teig (2006) finds
a negative relationship between a transparent government and the level of corruption, as
his result show statistically significant evidence to correlate corruption and output. Benito
and Bastida (2009) study a sample of 41 countries, developed and developing ones, and find
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that higher fiscal transparency leads to higher voter turnouts and a decreased budget deficit,
which then in turn translates into better economic outcomes, including output per capita.
The empirical work of Montez and Lima (2018) shows a negative relationship between fiscal
transparency and inflation, which they attribute to lower economic volatilities. They argue
that the effect of inflation volatility on inflation expectations is stronger than the positive
externalities of a more transparent government, thus resulting in an overall decrease in
inflation. They find that this effect is stronger in developing countries and countries whose
central bank adopts inflation targeting.
With regard to the effects of fiscal transparency on government debt, Bernoth and Goff
(2008) empirically study the effects of creative accounting on interest rate spreads between
bond yields in European countries; they find that a higher degree of fiscal transparency
reduces risk premia, a result which they attribute to the relatively lower influence that
a government announcement has on financial markets’ beliefs regarding the current fiscal
position. Wang et al. (2012) study the same relationship by mimicking the work of Duffie
and Lando (2001), but they edit their asset density function with added positive bias; they
find that low fiscal transparency, which they refer to as fiscal opacity, increase credit spreads
non-linearly. Alt and Lassen (2006) study a cross-section off 19 countries in 1999 to study the
impact of fiscal transparency on the government deficit; they show that fiscal transparency
ensures better fiscal outcomes when the size of the debt is small enough, less than 1% of GDP,
but they are unable to come to the same conclusion in countries that have large outstanding
public debt.
In the existing economic literature numerous fiscal transparency papers study it quantitatively by exploiting the notion of creative accounting. Creative accounting is a government
practice strategically implemented to lead individuals to form beliefs on fiscal policy that
differ from its actual fiscal position. Von Hagen and Wolff (2006) show some European countries in the midst of a sovereign default crisis tend to utilize stock-flow adjustments, a form
of creative accounting, to hide budget deficits. This phenomenon is particularly prevalent to
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circumvent the EU regulation named Stability and Growth Pact, whose very primary goal
is to constrain government behavior. Milesi-Ferretti (2000) theoretically studies what types
of environments lead governments to engage in creative accounting practices. She finds that
when the publicly-available budget is not transparent to begin with governments are more
likely to trade off a, costly, fiscal adjustment in favor or creative accounting. Unsurprisingly,
Koen and van den Noord (2004) show that the more binding fiscal rules are the more likely
a government is to adopt fiscal gimmicks.
Every paper mentioned above is an empirical one, whereas this paper takes a theoretical
approach to study the effect of fiscal transparency on output, inflation, and government debt.
To the author’s best knowledge, there does not exist a study that analyzes these relationships
using the New Keynesian 3-equation model. Hence, our most significant contribution is that
we theoretically model fiscal transparency using the notion of creative accounting.

3. Model
We adopt the framework of the New Keynesian 3-equation model and analyze fiscal transparency in a similar fashion to how the existing literature models central bank transparency
(Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, De Haan, Jansen, 2008; Poutineau, Sobczak, Vermandel,
2015). The model consists of three equations, each specifying the three variables of interest:
output, inflation, and government debt.
We start off by introducing the notion of fiscal transparency. The works of Koen and van
der Noord (2005), von Hagen and Wolff (2006), and Milesi-Ferretti (2000) show evidence to
argue that governments regularly engage in creative accounting practices to booster their
fiscal position and mislead financial markets. Once the government makes an official announcement regarding its fiscal position, we can write
Ft − Ftofficial = CAt

(1)

where CA = c + c . We assume that investors know c, the average usage of creative account-
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ing, and that they do not know the true fiscal position of the government. Ft is the actual
fiscal position and Ftofficial is what the government says it is. Combining the two, we have
Ft − Ftofficial = c + c ⇒ Ftofficial + c = Ft − 

(2)

where  is normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation ρ. Let Ftofficial = Ftofficial +

c. After the government makes an official announcement regarding its fiscal position, there
is a second announcement, done by news outlets and other agencies that closely follow
government activities. This is another estimate of Ft , which we denote by
Ftother = Ft − η

(3)

where η is also normally distributed with mean equal to zero. Hence, households’ true
expectation of the government’s fiscal position is given by
Fte =

ρFofficial + ωFtother
=
ρ+ω

ω
ρFofficial + ω Fofficial + ωFtother − ω Fofficial
= Fofficial +
(F other − Fofficial ).
ρ+ω
ρ+ω t
Let γ =

ω
ρ+ω

(4)

and mt = Ftother − Fofficial , so we have

Fte (mt ) = Fofficial + γmt .

(5)

The parameter γ captures the level of precision of the news agencies’ announcement with
respect to government’s announcement. Thus, γ = 0 means that news agencies do not lead
financial markets to believe that the government’s creative accounting practices are greater
than it says they are; vice-versa, γ = 1 means that news outlet completely disregard the
government’s announcement and are able to completely sway the opinion of investors about
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creative accounting.
A more transparent government means that the value of m decreases, since the difference
between the two fiscal policy announcement get small. Furthermore, we assume that the
government intends to enact fiscal policy; this means that a higher level of fiscal transparency
decreases the asymmetry of information and households behave optimally, thus gives the
government more freedom and flexibility to allocate money optimally. Therefore, Fte (mt ) < 0.
Below is a summary of the relationship between m and Fte :
• mt = 0 ⇒ Fte (mt ) = Fofficial
• mt ↑ ⇒ Fte (mt ) ≥ Fofficial

• mt ↓ ⇒ Fte (mt ) ≤ Fofficial .

As mt decreases, the difference between Ftother and F̃ official decreases, therefore the government
becomes more transparent with regards to fiscal policy. Intuitively, if the government’s
announcement is clear and concise, i.e. the government is transparent, the news media’s
announcement will closely resemble the one of the government and household will form
belief on fiscal policy that are close enough to the government’s true fiscal position. On the
other hand, if the government is vague and not transparent, then news outlets will all have
different interpretations in the second announcement and the public will form a wide range
of opinions on fiscal policy.
The output equation is derived from the standard dynamic IS curve equation:
e
−
yt = yt+1

1
e
(rt − πt+1
) − αDt .
σ

(6)

This relationship arises from the intertemporal equilibrium condition of a representative
household given its budget constraint (Poutineau et al., 2015). Specifically, the output gap
in period t is a function of the expected output gap in period t + 1 and the real interest rate
e
); σ is the risk-aversion parameter. Lastly, dt is government debt in period t, so
(rt − πt+1
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Dt = Gt − Tt (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2013). The coefficient α is negative because when Dt
increases the government has to issue bonds to borrow money to repay its debt obligations.
This corresponds to a leftward shift in the supply curve in the loanable funds model, which
causes an increase in interest rates and a decrease in the price of the outstanding bonds.
Therefore, the households that already owned government bonds will get a lower return than
they otherwise would have, thereby decreasing public savings. Recalling the identity ”total
savings = total investment”, we have an overall decrease in output.
We model inflation using a standard Phillips Curve equation:
e
+ κyt .
πt = βπt+1

(7)

This relationship arises from the aggregation of supply decisions by firms that operate under
nomnal price stickiness (Poutineau et al., 2015). Specifically, inflation in period t is a function
of expected inflation in period t + 1 and the output gap in period t; β is the discount factor
and κ represents the increase in inflation from a one-unit increase in the output gap.
We model government debt using the following equation:
Dt = Dt−1 (1 + rt − πt ) + θFte (mt ).

(8)

Government debt in period t depends on government debt in period t − 1, accounting for the
real interest rate (1+rt −πt ), and the expected fiscal policy as a function of fiscal transparency.
Recall that the quantity mt is the difference between the government’s announcement and
the media’s announcement.

4. Results and Analysis
From equations (6) − (8), we total-differentiate each to get:
dy = dy −

1
1
dr + dπ − αdD
σ
σ
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dπ = βdπ + κdy

(10)

dD = dD(1 + r − π) + D(dr − dπ) + θFm dm.

(11)

In this paper we are interested in the effect of fiscal transparency on output, inflation,
and government debt:

dy
, dπ ,
dm dm

and

dD
dF

respectively, in order to conduct comparative statics

analysis. Furthermore, since we are interested in the independent effect of fiscal transparency,
we set the change in interest rate equal to 0, that is dr = 0. By re-writing the system of
equations above in matrix form we have

  
α   dy   0 
− σ1
 0

  


  
−κ 1 − β
0 
  dπ  =  0  ,


  

0
0
r−π
dD
θFm ∂m


where the determinant is


 0
− σ1
α


 −κ 1 − β
0



 0
0
r−π






 = −κdα − 1 κ(r − π) < 0,

σ




provided that r > π. Note that this is a reasonable assumption, given current levels of
inflation and interest rates.
Using Cramer’s Rule, we have

dy
=
dm



 0
− σ1
α


 0 1−β
0



0
r−π
 θFm
−κdα − σ1 κ(r − π)
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=

−α(1 − β)θFm
−κdα − σ1 κ(r − π)

(12)
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 0
0
α


 −κ 0
0



 0 θFm r − π














 0
− σ1
0


 −κ 1 − β
0



 0
d
θFm












dπ
=
dm
−κdα − σ1 κ(r − π)

dD
=
dm
−κdα − σ1 κ(r − π)

=

−αFm
−dα − σ1 (r − π)

(13)

=

− σ1 Fm
.
−dα − σ1 (r − π)

(14)

From equation (12), recall that we assumed Fte (mt ) < 0. This implies that as fiscal
transparency increases households are able to form accurate beliefs on the government fiscal
position, which allows it to pass the expansionary policy measures that it desires, which
corresponds to a larger fiscal stimulus, that is Fm < 0. Therefore,

dy
dm

< 0. This means that

a decrease in m, which is an increase in fiscal transparency, leads to an increase in total
output. While a direct relationship between the two variables is not immediately obvious,
the source of this result is probably correlated to the positive externalities brought about
by a more transparent government. This is in fact consistent with the findings of Galois
and Wei (2002) and Teig (2006): a decrease in fiscal opacity most likely decreases the risk
premium associated with financing projects, increases consumer confidence and political
stability. Hameed (2006) also finds that fiscal transparency is positively correlated with
fiscal discipline, which means that the government is able to efficiently allocate money to
meaningful projects, thus stimulating economic activity. The aggregate effect is an increase
in total output.
For the effect of fiscal transparency on inflation we have
−αFm
dπ
=
.
dm
−Dα − σ1 (r − π)
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Similar to above, Fm < 0 implies that

dπ
dm

is also negative. Therefore, an increase in fiscal

transparency leads to an increase in inflation as well. This relationship is perhaps even
more indirect than the one with GDP, since it is so heavily influenced by expectations.
When fiscal transparency increases, households expect that expansionary fiscal policy will
stimulate economic activity which will likely help the economy grow, causing inflation to rise.
One the one hand, this result partially agrees with Sargent and Wallace (1989), who argue
that a higher degree of fiscal transparency increases the government trustworthiness and
their ability to effectively stimulate economic activity which leads to an increase inflation.
For reference, they also find that fiscal transparency eases the pressure on the central bank,
especially when it operates under an inflation mandate, which means that it has an even
broader impact on those countries. On the other hand, this result goes against the findings
of Montez and Lima (2018) whose work shows that a higher degree of fiscal transparency
lowers inflation rates and inflation volatility as well as that this effect is stronger in developing
countries.
Finally, for the effect of fiscal transparency on government debt we have
− σ1 Fm
dD
=
.
dm
−Dα − σ1 (r − π)
Similar to above, Fm < 0 implies that

dD
dm

is also negative. An increase in fiscal transparency

increases the credit ratings and the share of debt owned by foreign creditors, thus allowing
the government to borrow more from the households than it otherwise would; this enhances
the already-present fiscal policy regime, leading to greater government spending and higher
levels of debt (Bastida et al., 2015; Kemoe and Zhan, 2018). This result goes against the
findings of Alt and Lassen (2006) that show that the positive effect of fiscal transparency
on output and revenue is greater than the fiscal burden caused by higher levels of spending;
the net result is therefore a lower government debt.
As per Trinh (2017), “the job of monetary policy is one of managing expectations”. One
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could thus draw a parallel between fiscal transparency and monetary policy transparency,
especially in an economy in which households are able to obtain crucial macroeconomic
information almost instantaneously, thanks to the 24-news cycle. Therefore, in terms of
policy implication under a sovereign default crisis, our model shows that a higher degree
of fiscal transparency increases output and therefore public revenue. Clear signs of fiscal
transparency for the government are the equivalent of forward guidance behavior for the
Federal Reserve. If the government is attempting to reassure and instill confidence in financial
markets, implementing changes to the way in which it goes about relaying information
about its finances can generate tangible benefits. For instance, publishing its fiscal position
more frequently, including more detailed descriptions of its spending, or decreasing (if not
completely eradicating) creative accounting practices are all possible routes to steer the
economy in the right direction. Even though our model shows an increase in the government
budget deficit, this is likely to only be temporary, as the economic growth and the positive
externalities of a transparency are able to restore faith in creditors and households and steer
the government onto the path of debt consolidation in the near future.

5. Conclusion
This paper investigates how fiscal transparency affects output, inflation, and government
debt, with some emphasis on sovereign default scenarios. We find that less fiscal opacity
creates a more favorable environment for the government to conduct expansionary fiscal
policy, which leads to higher GDP, higher inflation, and higher government debt. All three
effects are linked to the government’s increased ability to borrow money in order to stimulate
economic activity.
Significant limitations of these results lie in the numerous assumptions we imposed on a lot
of our variables as well as in the fact that we modeled the economy with only three equations.
We used the notion of creative accounting as a proxy for fiscal transparency, but there are
several other ways to specify the same indicator. Furthermore, a lot of the rationalizations in
our conclusions rely on the results already present in the existing literature, whose theoretical
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(and sometimes empirical) approach is entirely different; that is, we assumed that certain
sectors of the economy, such as financial markets or households, behave the same way they
do in prior research without actually modeling or specifying their incentive structure.
The topic of fiscal transparency is undoubtedly at the forefront of the economic literature, especially in an environment where the news cycle keeps us updated on current events
every minute of every day. Future theoretical papers studying this issue should consider an
environment which includes more agents with rigorous incentive structures and constraints,
in order to cement the conclusions on solid ground. Moreover, since there does not exist a
rigorous definition of fiscal transparency, further studies should consider modeling it using
more than one indicator and minimize its inherent specification bias.
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ABSTRACT
International pressure to meet climate and sustainability goals are mounting. Countries attempting to
industrialize in the age of sustainability are tasked with industrializing using low-carbon practices. The
transition to a “green” economy requires elimination of some jobs and skillsets that may upset social
equality. This paper empirically examines the hypothesis that policies aimed at increased environmental
performance promote increased income inequality in developing countries. Because existing literature
firmly supports the hypothesis that lower income inequality leads to higher environmental performance,
this paper develops a simultaneous equations model (SEM) to estimate the hypothesized endogenous
relationship using two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation with an instrumental variable. While the
instrumental variables employed were not per se valid, the 2SLS estimation results for the sample of
developing countries reflects a positive and practically large, though statistically insignificant effect of air
quality on income inequality.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Economies around the globe are facing pressure to become more environmentally
friendly in their economic activities. Since the 1970’s, global agreements, protocols, and
conventions have arisen with the goal of achieving collaborative solutions to mounting
environmental strain. This pressure was intensified by the 2015 adoption of the United Nations’
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a comprehensive list of goals to continue global
economic growth in environmentally, economically, and socially sustainable ways. However,
despite the SDGs’ concurrent goals of reduced inequality, inclusive economic growth, and
environmental sustainability, the transition to sustainability necessarily involves shifting away
from many traditional, stable carbon-intensive industries including industrial sectors, nonrenewable energy, natural resource extraction, etc.
Both developed and developing countries are tasked with meeting such goals, whether
through formal contract or economic and social pressures from other nations. I expect that
developing countries might be disadvantaged in achieving the same goals as those who have
achieved advanced levels of income and development. The development process historically
relies on carbon-intensive industrialization activities as a fundamental driver of economic
prosperity and growth. Such carbon-intensive industries also provide many low-skilled and
labor-intensive jobs, such as mining and truck driving. Due to the large environmental impact of
industrialization and subsequent goals to alter or diminish its environmental footprint, I expect
that developing countries experience challenges and ramifications when attempting to meet these
goals that developed countries do not.
The transition from manufacturing and resource-intensive (environmentally degrading)
industries to an economy powered by more environmentally friendly, low-carbon industries will
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require education and training that is not yet present and less accessible to particular factions of
the population. Poorer people who conventionally hold low-skilled, labor-intensive jobs and
have less access to education and training will suffer disproportionately from this change. Thus,
this research attempts to ask the question: do policies that increase environmental quality tend to
increase income inequality? I hypothesize that decreased environmental degradation (that is,
higher environmental quality) leads to increased income inequality in developing countries.
Section II of this paper will explore the conclusions of the existing literature surrounding
this relationship. Section III will discuss the theory used to formulate the hypothesis and the
methodology employed to test it. Section IV describes the data used for econometric testing.
Section V discusses the results and Section VI will discuss overall conclusions, policy
implications, and challenges for future research on this topic.

II. LITERATURE
The existing literature relevant to this hypothesis is broken up into two main bodies.
First, that which acknowledges the relationship but hypothesizes causality such that income
inequality affects environmental quality. Second, that which posits a relationship such that
environmental quality affects income inequality. This paper contributes uniquely to the existing
literature by proposing an empirical model to test the latter relationship.

i. INEQUALITY AFFECTS ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) theory hypothesizes that as income per capita
increases, environmental degradation increases up to a particular point in the development
process (as illustrated by a threshold amount of income). After this threshold is reached,
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environmental degradation begins to fall again when economies shift to less resource-intensive
growth strategies. Graphically, this demonstrates what has been described as an “inverted-Ushape” (Dinda, 2004; Grossman and Krueger 1991; Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, 1992; and
Panayotou, 1999). Boyce (1994) expands EKC theories to include income inequality as a
necessary determinant of environmental quality. He argues that when there is economic activity
that is environmentally harmful, there are people who benefit from it (“winners”) and people are
harmed by it (“losers”). The winners, he posits, are those with some form of power over others.
If these winners could theoretically compensate losers for environmentally damaging activities
and still win, then it is efficient to continue with the degrading activity. Generally, he notes,
winners will not compensate losers and will simply ignore externalities, thus the degrading
activity will be pursued even when its net impact to society is negative (Boyce, 1994). Thus,
higher levels of inequality in both power and wealth (which he essentially equates because those
with greater wealth are generally more powerful) will incite greater environmental damage. He
dubs this idea the “equality hypothesis.” Torras and Boyce (1998) build off of Boyce (1994) by
using empirical analysis to criticize EKC scholars which rely on income per capita as the chief
explanatory variable. Echoing Boyce (1994), they find that more equitable income/power
distributions will result in lower environmental degradation.
While these hypotheses are not directly comparable to my hypothesis, they are important
and relevant. Unlike traditional EKC theorists, my hypothesis focuses on income inequality as
opposed to income per capita. Furthermore, this paper treats environmental quality as the
independent variable which affects income inequality, as opposed the literature which treats
income as the independent which affects environmental quality. Nonetheless, this literature is
useful to consider as it explains linkage between environmental performance and income
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inequality. Moreover, the EKC theory is helpful to my hypothesis because it suggests that after a
certain point of economic development, the relationship between environmental degradation and
income changes dramatically. Thus, this theory guides my expectation that for developed
countries, environmental performance will have a negative if not neutral relationship with
income inequality.

ii. ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE AFFECTS INEQUALITY
While previous theory indicates a link between the two variables, there is little existing
research that supports this paper’s hypothesis that greater environmental performance increases
income inequality. Some authors and international organizations published reports discussing
the theoretical causal relationship between environmental performance and income inequality,
but nobody has formulated an empirical model to test it. This section will examine the existing
theoretical reasoning for my hypothesis.
The OECD (2016) discusses expected economic challenges that accompany the transition
to environmentally friendly economic activities, which are summarized in Figure 1. This lays a
foundation for the discussion of a potential relationship working opposite the relationship already
established in the literature. Dercon (2012) contributes to this theoretical foundation for the
argument by explaining that the poor are disproportionately affected by such economic shifts. It
is important to consider these economic implications from the poor both in situations where the
poor act as consumers and where they act as producers, Dercon (2012) argues. In the
consumption context, the poor typically spend a larger share of their income on energy and
environmental goods like water and fuel. The poor also lack resources to adapt to environmental
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pressures. Therefore, shocks to the price of these goods due to policy changes and regulation to
mitigate environmental degradation will most heinously affect the poor (Dercon, 2012: 11).
On the production side, too, the poor tend to suffer disproportionately. The United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) produced a report in 2008 which discusses in depth
the potential implications of the transition towards sustainable development. One noteworthy
conclusion is that such economic change will be accompanied by be several changes to overall
employment which will thus affect the poor as producers. With greater global focus on
environmental performance, it is expected that some jobs will be created – such as the design,
innovation, and manufacturing of new equipment such as abatement devices and monitors.
Some jobs will be substituted or transformed – for example, those working in extraction of fossil
fuels may instead be hired by renewable energy industries. Other positions will be completely
eliminated, such as production of goods such as packaging materials which may be discouraged
or banned for environmental reasons (UNEP, 2008). Not all low-skilled jobs will be eliminated,
but as with any new venture, there will be a learning curve to many new processes.
Because curbing environmental damage implies diversion of resources and investment
from “conventional growth-oriented opportunities,” demand will drop for many exports (which
tend to be resource-intensive) from low-income countries (Decron, 2012: 3, 8). The economic
costs of transforming an economy into a green economy will be most felt by the developing
world which hopes to achieve economic growth and mobility. Decron (2012) discusses the tight
link between growth and poverty and points out that inhibited growth tends to inhibit poverty
reduction. Therefore, he argues, “there will be distributional effects that do not necessarily
imply Pareto improvements for everyone unless there are also (lump sum) transfers to
compensate the losers… [which] rarely happens” (2012; 9). For example, it is common for the
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poor’s income to rely on “environmental capital” (natural resources, animal products, etc.), thus
making them most susceptible to income shocks due to environmental policy changes (Dercon,
2012: 12). Policy change or regulation that raises the cost of using environmental capital will
incentivize a shift to production that relies less on environmental goods and more on other forms
of capital (physical, human). The poor tend to face greater barriers to these alternative forms of
capital (for example, transition to new technology may require skills or training that is costly to
the poor but more accessible to the wealthy). “The key for the poor would be the low-skilledlabor intensity [of greener industries],” Dercon explains. “The expectation that industries need
to find more energy efficient ways of production may lead to higher intensity in human and
physical capital with sophisticated technologies, which are not necessarily labor intensive”
(Dercon, 2012: 12). Dercon acknowledges that, due to lack of existing relevant research focused
on developing countries, these conclusions are greatly conjecture. Nonetheless, the conclusions
imply that, absent policy provisions to favor or compensate the poor, prioritization of
environmental quality through emphasis on green economic activity will promote inequality.
Musyoki (2012) argues accordingly that green economic policies must involve measures
aimed at poverty reduction and empowerment of minorities to avoid unequal economic growth.
Some of the policies and stipulations he suggests include equal access to skill development,
opportunities for livelihood diversification, and ensure affordable green energy to the poor
(Musyoki, 2012: 4). Without such accommodating policies and provisions, the transition to a
greener economy may have concentrated benefits which exacerbate societal inequalities (Cook et
al., 2012; ADBI, 2013). There is a plausible concern for simultaneity such that environmental
degradation may exacerbate inequality in addition to the well-documented belief that inequality
affects environmental quality (UNRISD, 2012). For this reason, I anticipate that low-skilled
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labor may be more adversely affected than higher skilled labor, which may potentially create
inequality. This paper builds upon existing literature by empirically testing this hypothesis.

IV. DATA
This research uses panel data covering a sample of 110 countries of varying income
level/development status spanning the years 2007 to 2017. Where a few data were missing, I
filled gaps with the variable mean. However, for datasets with no data for an individual country
across all years, I left absent data as blank observations.
My dependent variable is income inequality (ineq), which I measure using the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Reports’ measure of inequality
in income (UNDP, Income Inequality, Inequality in income, 2018). This metric uses the
Atkinson index to capture inequality in an income distribution based on household surveys. I
chose this indicator over other conventional measures of inequality (such as the GINI coefficient,
Palma coefficient, or quintile ratio) primarily due to data availability. While I considered
attempting to create my own income distribution ratio, international datasets are not complete
enough to sufficiently improve my model by offering data for a greater number of countries.
This data unavailability ultimately creates an issue of small sample size which I will discuss in
my conclusions and opportunities for further research.
This paper uses air quality (aq) as a proxy for environmental policy (and subsequently
environmental quality) as measured as an indicator included in Yale University’s Environmental
Performance Index (EPI). The EPI scores and ranks individual country’s performance on
priority environmental issues. The index is constructed using data on several measures that fall
under one of two main issue areas: environmental health and ecosystem vitality (Hsu et al., 2016
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Environmental Performance Index, 2016). In this index, air quality is an indicator of
environmental health that is comprised of several subcomponents. The first subcomponent is
household air quality, defined as the percentage of the population using solid fuels as primary
cooking fuel and Health Risk from PM2.5 (particulate matter that have a diameter of less than
2.5 micrometers) exposure. The second is air pollution defined as average exposure to PM2.5.
The third subcomponent is air pollution exceedance, measured as the proportion of the
population with exposure levels above World Health Organization thresholds. The fourth and
final subcomponent is air pollution based on exposure to nitrogen dioxide.
The second instrumental variable explored in this paper, tree cover loss (forest), is also
sourced from EPI 2016 data. EPI measures this as tree cover loss in greater than 50% tree cover
divided by 2000 levels. It is thus expressed as a rate of loss. See Figure 3 for a more complete
breakdown of other subindexes which compose the EPI and their relative size and relevance to
the air quality index. EPI is a biennial project. Data is available using the 2018 index, but the
index has evolved over time. Therefore, in order to create panel data using this index, I used the
2016 backcasted data, in which the developers of the data reevaluated the years 2007 to 2015
using the 2016 index. Using this backcasted data allows me to make valid comparisons across
different years (Hsu et al., 2016 Environmental Performance Index, 2016).
Because I expect, as existing literature indicates, that political and economic institutions
also have a strong influence on economic inequality, I control for political oppression using the
variable opp to capture a rating of political freedom as calculated by Freedom House in their
2018 Freedom in the World report. Freedom House has produced this report annually since
1973, and therefore its data covers 195 countries and 14 territories for over 40 years. This
variable represents a score between 0 and 4 for each of 10 indicators of political rights such that
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countries with a score of 0 have the smallest degree of freedom and those with a 4 have the
greatest. The questions measure three categories of interest: electoral processes, political
pluralism and participation, and the functioning of government. This score is then translated into
a rating between 1 and 7 such that countries with a rating of 1 are quite free and “enjoy a wide
range of political rights…candidates who are elected actually rule, political parties are
competitive…and the interests of minority groups are well represented in politics and
government” (Puddington & Dunham, 2019). Alternatively, countries rated 7 are quite unfree
“because of sever government oppression...some are police states…[while others] suffer from
extreme violence or rule by regional warlords” (Puddington & Dunham, 2019). Because, when
included, an index of economic freedom (Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom index) is
collinear with political oppression, I omit this economic freedom variable. Theoretically, it is
fair to assume that generally, the two go hand in hand such that countries that are politically free
are often more economically free and globally integrated. Thus I capture the effect of both
political and economic institutions using the opp variable.
I control for levels of education among a population as a potential determinant of income
inequality. Education (educ) data is captured using mean years of education achieved by people
age 25 and older in a population as recorded by the UNDP as part of the Human Development
Reports. While I considered using literacy rates to gauge education (which would benefit this
research by capturing both formal and informal education), lack of data availability dictated my
use of mean years of schooling. I collected data on GDP per capita (gdppc) based on purchasing
power parity measured in current international dollars from the World Bank (2018).
This paper also controls for the impact on inequality of reliance on agriculture relative to
other industries like manufacturing which tend to drive down income inequality. Countries with
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higher employment in manufacturing are generally more equal because manufacturing generally
offers a narrow range of relatively high earnings for modestly educated people (Long,
Rasmussen, & Haworth, 1977). Contrarily, countries with a larger share of employment in
agriculture will tend to be less equal. Thus, I control for this influence using ag, that is, the
relative size of the agricultural sector. This variable takes the form of employment in agriculture
as a percentage of total employment in an economy, as per the World Bank.
The control variable ldc is a binary variable such that ldc = 1 for less developed countries
and ldc = 0 for developed. I used data from the World Bank on analytical classification history
by country and the World Bank’s 2018 standards for characterization of low- and middle-income
countries as developing and high-income countries as developed. For years when a country was
considered low- or lower-middle-income, I classified the country as “developing.” If at some
point it became high-income, as determined by the Bank, it would be reclassified as
“developed.”
The instrumental variable cprecip (change in precipitation between years) was calculated
using data from the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal. The dataset was
produced by the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) of University of East Anglia (UEA) and
reformatted by the International Water Management Institute (IWMI). I collected the data
initially as monthly averages of rainfall in millimeters, which I later converted to annual
averages. This paper also experiments using tree cover loss (forest) as an instrumental variable.
Because forests are an important subindicator of the EPI, I extracted the data from that dataset.
III. THEORY & METHODOLOGY
There is no universal understanding of what environmental policies and economic
activities necessarily encourage higher environmental performance. Literature often refers to

102

Skinner 12

such activity as being “low-carbon,” “sustainable,” or “green.” More than a dozen published
definitions of “green growth,” exist to date. The OECD synthesize some of these definitions in
Figure 2 which may be helpful for our practical understanding of what sustainable
environmental policies might look like in practice. By adopting policies such as those discussed
by the OECD (see Figure 1) and implied by the definition of low-carbon infrastructure discussed
above, environmental quality will increase, though I expect at the cost of economic equality (as
explained in the literature review). Alternatively, I expect that developed countries will not have
a positive relationship between environmental quality and income inequality. The EKC theory
indicates that after a certain point in the growth process (i.e. once a country is developed),
environmental degradation sharply decreases. After a country is “developed,” the marginal
impact of a policy to increase environmental quality will be smaller. By improving quality of
life for the population (including the poor), perhaps they will have better health and even be able
to achieve greater mobility. Therefore, it would make sense that developing countries would see
a different relationship between environmental quality and income inequality than their
developed counterparts.
To determine the proper estimation technique for my panel data model, I run the
Hausman Specification Test which recommends a fixed effects estimation rather than random
effects. This makes sense as the presence of unobserved country-fixed effects is more than
likely. I run separate fixed effects estimations for a sample of developed countries and a sample
of developing (or less developed) countries. Comparing normal standard errors to those which
are robust reflects a difference, thus indicating the presence of heteroskedasticity. I also suspect
autocorrelation may be present; thus I use the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
on both of these regressions. The tests indicate that both the regression of developing countries

103

Skinner 13

and that of developed countries contain autocorrelation. I therefore attempt to correct for
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Because my panel is of the “large N, small T” variety
(that is, my data is comprised of a relatively large number of panels and a small number of time
periods), I attempt to simultaneously correct for both using cluster-robust standard errors.
Existing literature argues that greater inequality negatively influences environmental
quality, which I believe is a well-supported argument. I also contend that my hypothesis that
environmental quality impacts income inequality holds merit. Thus, I suspect that these
variables are endogenous and jointly determined. I begin with an OLS estimation (see Appendix
Table 3) which does not yield efficient estimators, nor does it display a statistically significant
relationship. This is to be expected, as it does not properly account for endogeneity. Thus, o
estimate this relationship while properly accounting for endogeneity, I employ a simultaneous
equations model (SEM) using an instrumental variable and two-staged least squares (2SLS)
estimation.

(1)
(2)

𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽7 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 =

∝0 + ∝1 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + ∝2 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 +∝3 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + ∝4 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 +∝5 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 +∝6 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + ∝7 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡

The first equation (1) represents the relationship between inequality and environmental
performance with the causality that most of the existing literature supports, whereas the second
(2) represents the relationship I hypothesize.
The selection of an appropriate instrument is challenging, as most factors that influence
environmental issues also somehow affect income distributions. A valid instrument in this case
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is a variable which must be both correlated with my measure of environmental quality (air
quality aq) and uncorrelated with inequality (ineq). I hypothesize that the change in precipitation
(cprecip) affects air quality without directly influencing income inequality because precipitation
washes out water-soluble pollutants and other particulate matter from air, thus improving air
quality. By examining correlation coefficients, it is not clear that this instrument is strong. This
instrument is a statistically significant determinant of income inequality for developing countries,
as demonstrated by a p-value of 0.038 in the first-stage regression on the less developed sample.
However, for the sample of developed countries, the instrument did not prove to be significant in
first-stage regression results, thus calling its strength into question.
Due to the questionable nature of the strength of precipitation rates as an instrument, I
also estimate the endogenous relationship using changes in tree cover (forest).

(3)
(4)

𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽7 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 =

∝0 + ∝1 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + ∝2 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 +∝3 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + ∝4 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 +∝5 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 +∝6 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + ∝7 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡

Tree cover loss does not boast a very direct influence on income inequality. However, there is
an argument to be made that deforestation has an effect on economic growth which may translate
into an effect on income inequality. Referring back to previous discussion of the EKC, one
could argue that deforestation (as a form of environmental degradation) increases with national
income (as a country develops), until that country reaches an amount of income associated with
being “developed,” at which point environmental protection is less of a luxury and more of a
normal good. After this threshold of national income, the deforestation would decline. Given
the Kuznets Curve (the inverted U-shaped relationship between income inequality and income
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per capita), we know that income inequality also has this type of relationship with income per
capita. Thus, there is likely some relationship (though perhaps indirect such that A leads to B
leads to C) between deforestation and income inequality.
Nonetheless, this paper experiments with the forest instrument and compares it to the
seemingly stronger instrument, cprecip. It is easy to understand how tree cover influences air
quality, given that trees supply oxygen and absorb gaseous pollutants, thus facilitating a natural
cleansing process of air (Nowak et al., 2014). The first-stage coefficient estimate on forest for
the instrumental variable regression of less developed countries reflects statistical insignificance,
while this estimate for the sample of developed countries was statistically significant.
Unfortunately, like cprecip, it is not apparent based on correlations or first-stage regression
results that forest is a strong instrument. Nonetheless, the inconclusive results and theory offer
some support to its potential legitimacy.

V. RESULTS
Because I hypothesize endogeneity in income inequality and air quality, a linear fixedeffects estimation is unlikely to be the most efficient means of estimation. Thus, I defer to twostage least squares estimation. First, I instrument using changes in precipitation rates (cprecip)
as demonstrated below in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.
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Table 1: 2SLS Results (Dependent Variable = Income Inequality)

In the two-stage estimation of the less developed sample (column 1), the coefficient on
air quality suggests that a 1% increase in air quality increases income inequality by 2.242%.
While this estimate’s statistical insignificance does not indicate that air quality is especially
important in determining income inequality in developing economies, the sign and magnitude
otherwise support my hypothesis. Moreover, the estimate is practically large, and thus deserves
consideration. The same two-staged regression on the sample of developed countries (column 2)
reflects a positive relationship such that a 1% increase in air quality would increase income
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inequality by 3.75%. Similar to the developing regression, this coefficient is insignificant. The
sign and magnitude of this relationship do not support my hypothesis and seem counterintuitive
to EKC theory.
Given the apparent weakness of my instrument choice based on first stage statistical
insignificance on cprecip, I conduct the same estimation using a different instrument: tree cover
loss (forest), the results of which are reflected above in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1. This
estimation contradicts the results of the previous estimation using cprecip as an instrument.
Where before the coefficient on air quality for less developed countries was 2.242, it has now
drastically changed in size and magnitude to -6.751. This would suggest that a 1% increase in
air quality leads to a 6.751% decrease in income inequality in developing countries, which
staunchly opposes my hypothesis. The coefficient on air quality in the sample of developed
countries (column 4) suggests a small positive increase of 0.364%, which is nearly negligible.
The magnitude counters my expectations, but the miniscule magnitude makes sense.
The drastic change in the coefficient estimate on my variable of interest, air quality, begs
suspicion. Upon examining the coefficients on my controls, I find questionable estimates in the
forest instrument regression. The coefficient estimate for political oppression (opp) for
developing countries when instrumenting with precipitation rates shows a statistically significant
and positive coefficient such that a 1 unit increase in the political rights rating (that is, a whole
number increase on the 1-7 scale which demonstrates a loss of political freedom) increases
income inequality by 2.448%. This result corresponds with intuition and theory which contend
that less free societies tend to be more unequal. This estimate is statistically significant for
developing countries. For developed countries, we see very similar magnitude and sign (which
again makes sense), though the coefficient is now insignificant. When the forest instrument is
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employed (columns 3 and 4), we see a negative coefficient on opp for both developing and
developed countries. This relationship follows neither intuition nor theory. Therefore, I am
inclined to prefer the results from the regression which employs the precipitation rate cprecip as
an instrument, though experimentation with other instrumental variables would surely benefit
this research, as neither instrument employed in this paper is especially compelling.

VI. CONCLUSION
This paper sought to determine the nature of the relationship between environmental
policies and income inequality in developing countries. This empirical study of the hypothesis
that policies that increase environmental quality (as captured by air quality) increases income
inequality in developing economies contributes uniquely to existing literature by formulating a
simultaneous equations model to test this theory, where there had previously been no proposed
empirical strategy.
Results from this SEM estimation offer some support for my hypothesis. Using the
instrumental variable cprecip, I find a positive coefficient estimate on air quality indicative of a
roughly 2.2% increase in income inequality as a result of a 1% increase in air quality in less
developed countries. For the less developed sample, cprecip is a more valid and legitimate
instrument than forest, and thus I consider this estimation to be most plausible. Therefore, if a
policy were enacted strengthening air pollution standards thus resulting in an increase in air
quality, we would expect income inequality to increase. This corroborates my hypothesis that, in
developing countries, environmental policies increase income inequality. I recognize that the
insignificance of the coefficient indicates that perhaps air quality is not a strong determinant of
income inequality as I have estimated it. However, literature and theory support the probability
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that this causal relationship exists. Therefore, future work can improve upon my model and
estimation techniques to hopefully find similar results with more reliable test statistics and
significance levels.
The estimates for air quality’s impact on income inequality in developed samples defies
expectations that it would be unlikely to have a positive impact. In fact, in the estimation using
the cprecip instrument (the instrument I ultimately prefer), this coefficient is notably larger than
that in developing countries, indicating that air quality improvements lead to an even greater
increase in income inequality in developed countries. Based on the EKC and the fact that
developed countries are generally post-industrial and more likely to respond well to technology
or skill changes than developing countries, this is a surprising result. Again, however, it is
statistically insignificant, so it must be taken with a grain of salt.
A potential policy implication that may be drawn from this conclusion is that
international organizations and sovereign governments alike must be weary of the consequences
of “sustainable development” through pursuit of “low-carbon” or “green” infrastructure and
industries. Meeting SDGs requires environmentally friendly activity that also promotes equality
– which these results indicate is a challenge. All policies aimed at sustainable development
ought to be accompanied by job training, skill-development programs, lump-sum transfers to
compensate the poor, or other poverty reduction measures as discussed in the literature.
However, due to the lack of statistical significance on these coefficients, these policy
implications require further, more robust research and corroboration before these results could be
truly useful and reliable for policy formulation.
Future research can improve this model in a number of ways. Firstly, as data in
developing countries becomes more accessible, better variables (and proxies) will become
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available to more accurately measure the relationship at hand. As data collection continues to
improve globally and more years of data become available, a longer time frame can be evaluated,
which would improve upon this study which focuses on an effect over a relatively short time
period. For example, my dependent variable, income inequality, was captured using data with
many holes in it. Due to lack of availability, I was forced to use a measure of inequality that is
uncommon and less ideal than a GINI coefficient or ratio of top income earners to bottom
income earners in a distribution. A more typical measure of income inequality with more
complete data may yield results that are easier to interpret and estimate. Moreover, lack of data
on inequality dramatically reduced the sample size on which this analysis rests. Existing
literature tends to work with much smaller sample sizes, such as individual countries or countries
in a particular geographic region. Thus, I would recommend narrowing the sample size and
ultimately the scope of the paper in accordance with these papers for more robust estimates with
less gaps in data.
Future research might also involve experimenting with different instruments. On a
theoretical level, finding a valid and strong instrument for this research is a challenge. That
challenge is exacerbated by poor data availability for developing countries. Perhaps as data
becomes more accessible, future researchers could experiment using participation in
environmental agreements or environmental regulatory stringency could be experimented with as
instrumental variables. Perhaps with more time, this research could have determined an
identifying instrument for the simultaneous equations system that yields a statistically significant
coefficient on the dependent variable of interest. Expansion of this research might also include a
wider range of control variables. However, I caution that several control variables such as
economic freedom, democracy, and manufacturing rates were dropped from this analysis due to
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collinearity. Collinearity is likely to be a problem in future research due to the inherent nature of
inequality and its determinants being so closely intertwined with each other.
Researchers hoping to improve this study could also experiment with different models
and estimation techniques. Perhaps to avoid the challenge of finding a stronger, valid
instrument, a more experienced researcher could apply the generalized method of moments
(GMM) or three-stage least squares (3SLS) to address endogeneity.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1: Examples of Policy Challenges by Development Status (OECD, 2016)

Figure 2: Defining Green Growth (OECD, 2016)
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Figure 3: EPI Breakdown (Hsu, A. et al., 2016)
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

countryid
year
ineq
aq

1,210
1,210
813
1,210

5.5
2012
23.67
73.40

31.76
3.16
10.80
16.66

1
2007
4.4
23.9

110
2017
68.3
97.98

educ
opp
gdppc
ag
ldc
cprecip
forest

1,210
1,210
1,210
1,210
1,210
1,123
1,210

8.32
3.29
17177.73
29.10
.47
7.97e+11
29.75

3.23
2.03
16645.82
25.13
.50
2.29e+11
20.60

1.3
1
613.73
0.17
0
5.15e+07
0.69

Variable
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polfree
75648.23
91.56
1
1.92e+12
89.26
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Table 3: OLS Results (Dependent Variable = Income Inequality)
(1)
LDC

(2)
Developed

Air quality (aq)

0.111
(0.174)

0.00326
(0.0733)

Political oppression (opp)

1.617
(1.055)

-0.413
(0.512)

Education (educ)

-1.803
(2.985)

-0.759
(0.925)

Size of agricultural sector (ag)

-0.0478
(0.177)

0.488
(0.303)

Lag GDP (gdppp_1)

-0.00598
(0.00502)

-0.000536
(0.000423)

Lag GDP squared (sqgdppp_1)

3.21e-07
(2.42e-07)

6.22e-09*
(3.64e-09)

Year

0.593
(0.532)

0.205
(0.194)

Constant

-1,155
(1,062)

-378.4
(383.1)

378
0.054
51

435
0.091
62

Variables

N
R-squared
Number of Countries
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